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This dissertation studies labor earnings mobility in the short-run and the structure
of labor markets in urban Mexico, from 1987 to 2002.
In the first part it gauges the average earnings mobility in the economy and
whether mobility equalized longer-term earnings. It also analyzes whether the
mobility patterns differ by groups of the population, and whether mobility reduced
longer-term earnings inequality between and within groups. The groups considered
are age, education, gender, quintile of initial earnings, sector, and region groups.
In general, average earnings mobility fluctuated around zero, with the excep-
tion of the late eighties and early 2000, when individuals experienced gains, and
of the years following the 1994 Peso crisis, when individuals experienced large
losses. These patterns are shared by the majority of the groups of the population,
with the exception of initial earnings quintile and sector groups. For these groups,
the most advantaged individuals experience the largest losses, while the most dis-
advantaged ones experience the largest gains. Furthermore, mobility equalized
longer-term earnings for the entire population during most of the periods stud-
ied, and it helped reduce longer-term earnings inequality within-groups. However,
mobility only sometimes equalized longer-term earnings between groups.
The second part of the dissertation studies short-run earnings dynamics at the
individual level. In particular, it examines whether mobility benefits more the ini-
tially advantaged individuals. Regression analysis shows a high level of convergence
between the earnings of rich and poor. However, part of this convergence reflects
transitory adjustments in earnings. In practice, most of the individuals keep their
permanent advantage, leading to little convergence between rich and poor. The
major exception to this finding occurs in the aftermath of the Peso crisis, when
individuals with a high permanent advantage experienced greater losses than the
rest of the population. The ceteris paribus impact of socioeconomic characteristics
of the individual on earnings mobility is gauged. Education, gender, region and
transitions between sectors are important factors affecting earnings mobility.
The final part of the dissertation tests whether Mexican urban labor markets
are segmented between formal and informal sectors. An econometric structural
model of sector choice is estimated, and a strong evidence of rationing of formal
sector jobs is found. The estimations also show that individuals rationed out of
the formal sector would experience large gains by moving into the formal sector.
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The topic of this dissertation is the study of the short-run dynamics of labor market
earnings and sector of employment in urban Mexico from 1987 to 2002.
The research on economic mobility issues in developing countries is fairly recent.
While mobility studies were performed in the developed world since the second-half
of the twentieth century, such topics started to be addressed in developing nations
only towards the end of last century. Part of this neglect was due to empirical
limitations, and part of it due to conceptual limitations. Empirically, very few
longitudinal studies (that follow the same unit of analysis over time) had been
conducted on these economies, and since mobility studies depend crucially on this
type of data, there were few opportunities to make such research. However, the
conceptual limitations of a discipline too used to analyzing issues of inequality and
poverty from a cross-sectional perspective also played a role in this story. Even
when development economists were concerned with issues of mobility, their habit
of relying on cross-sectional empirical data, prevented them from tackling many of
the interesting mobility questions once new data became available.1
The importance of mobility studies comes from their ability to follow the des-
tinies of the agents of interest (be it individuals, households, firms, etc.) over
time. This advantage over cross-sectional studies helps in tackling new questions
that are inherently dynamic in nature. For instance, questions like “How did the
1As evidence to this, comes the fact that the data used in this dissertation
started becoming available in the late eighties. However, it was not until very
recently, that it was used to conduct a proper mobility study in Mexico.
1
2initially poor fare over time?”, “What employment transitions did an individual
experience?”, “Has long-run inequality increased or decreased?”, etc. can only be
answered with panel data.
The present dissertation devotes two of its main chapters to the study of earn-
ings mobility per se. The other main chapter deals with the old controversial issue
of whether labor markets are segmented, and analyzes the implications of this
market structure on earnings mobility.
The data used in this dissertation is a series of short overlapping panels with
quarterly information tracking individuals for at most 1 year. The geographic area
studied is urban Mexico, and the period covered by these short-lived panels goes
from January 1987 to December 2002. The dataset used is a household survey that
provides information on labor market variables (including labor market earnings)
and the socioeconomic characteristics of individuals.
Although it would be desirable to have panel data following individuals for
more than a year, such data does not exist yet for Mexico. Instead, what can
be learned from this study is the short-run dynamics of earnings and sector of
employment, under varying macroeconomic conditions. Having many short-lived
panels, covering over 15 years, is a unique opportunity for analyzing an economy
like the Mexican, which underwent radical transformations during this period,
including a long process of economic liberalization, and a severe financial crisis in
December 1994.
1.2 Questions
The questions addressed in this dissertation can be organized in three main cate-
gories.
31) Aggregate Earnings Mobility Questions:
“What are the average earnings gains and losses in the economy?”, “Are these
earnings mobility patterns the same for different groups of the population?”, “Does
mobility equalize earnings over time?”, “Does mobility equalize earnings within
groups over time?” and “Does mobility equalize earnings between groups over
time?”. The analysis is performed on various groups of the population according
to age, education, gender, initial earnings quintile, region and sector groups.
2) Initial Earnings and the Determinants of Earnings Mobility:
“How does initial earnings affect earnings mobility?”, in particular “Are the
most advantaged individuals gaining more (losing less) in terms of earnings changes?”,
“What is the ceteris paribus impact of socioeconomic characteristics of the individ-
ual on earnings mobility?”, and “How do these factors affect the impact of initial
earnings on mobility?”.
3) Labor Market Segmentation and Mobility:
“Are Mexican labor markets segmented?”, in particular “Are formal sector jobs
rationed?”. If so, “What are the potential earnings gains that rationed individuals
could experience by moving into the formal sector?”, “What is the actual earnings
mobility experienced by rationed individuals if they manage to enter the formal
sector in further periods?”.
All these questions will be addressed using the same survey. The earnings mo-
bility analyzed will be yearly earnings mobility. This allows capturing the longest
period of time possible for each individual, and avoids having to worry about
issues of seasonality. Also, these questions will be analyzed under varying macro-
economic conditions, capturing the various changes experienced by the Mexican
economy during the years under study.
41.3 Previous Research and My Contribution
The study of economic mobility is relatively new in economics. It is mostly during
the second half of the twentieth century that this area of research sprung in the
empirical literature. Part of the reason for this late entrance into the discipline was
the lack of suitable longitudinal data following individuals over time as well as the
evolution of their incomes, consumption patterns, employment status, occupation,
etc. Although earnings mobility studies started relatively early within the mobility
literature, with the seminal ‘permanent earnings model’ of Friedman and Kuznets
(1954), it would take two more decades for such studies to start appearing more
systematically.2
In the case of developing economies the study of mobility is even more recent,
with most of the studies dating from the last decade and a half. Again, the lack
of suitable panel data is partly to blame for this. For many decades the attention
of empirical economists interested in issues of welfare, poverty and inequality, was
solely focused on static pictures of the economy. Needless to say, this was rather
limiting, since it prevented answering questions like whether some individuals were
stuck in poverty, or what caused upward mobility.
Mobility studies have been recently performed for a wide variety of develop-
ing countries like China (Nee, 1996; Jalan and Ravallion, 2000), and India (Gaiha,
1988; Coondoo and Dutta, 1990) in Asia, South Africa (Fields et al., 2003a,b), and
Zimbabwe (Gunning et al., 2000) in Africa, Hungary (Galasi, 1998) in Eastern Eu-
rope, and Argentina (Sa´nchez-Puerta, 2005), Peru (Herrera, 1999), and Venezuela
(Freije, 2001) in Latin America, just to mention a few examples. This expansion
2Atkinson et al. (1992), and Fields and Ok (1999a) present an overview on the
methods and empirical results relevant for developed economies.
5can also be witnessed by the fact that two major journals specializing in Develop-
ment Economics have devoted entire issues to the topic (August 2000 issue of the
Journal of Development Studies, and March 2003 issue of World Development).3
For the case of Mexico, the number of mobility studies addressing earnings
dynamics is limited. Previous studies focusing on the evolution of incomes (or
earnings) were made by means of comparable cross-sections and not with longitu-
dinal data (see for instance Lustig and Sze´kely (1999), and Corte´s (2000)). Many of
these studies focused on the evolution of poverty and inequality over time, but since
they did not follow the same individuals they do not constitute mobility studies
as such. A large body of literature built around studying the impact of the (quite
recurrent) past economic crises, and the strategies used by households to cope with
them. Examples of this literature are Selby and Browning (1992), Lo´pez-Acevedo
and Salinas (2000), Attanasio and Sze´kely (2004), McKenzie (2003), Maloney and
Cunningham (2000) and Maloney et al. (2004). However, the vast majority of
these references are not mobility studies in a strict sense.4
It is important to mention that there is a set of studies on economic mobility in
Mexico that analyzes other types of variables like education (Binder and Woodruff
(2002), Dahan and Gaviria (1999), Behrman et al. (2001)), occupation (Latap´ı,
1992), sector of economic activity5 (Ibarlucea, 2003), and regional convergence in
earnings (Aguayo-Tellez, 2005).
Aggregate earnings mobility in Mexico has been studied in only a couple of
papers. The studies by Wodon (2001) and Yitzhaki and Wodon (2002) examine
3Further references are reviewed in Fields (2001) and Baulch and Hoddinott
(2000).
4The exception being the papers coauthored by Maloney, which will be reviewed
in detail in the literature review section of Chapter 4.
5Meaning manufacturing, agriculture, services, etc.
6Time dependence in economic positions, the first comparing urban Mexico and Ar-
gentina, the second only in rural Mexico.6 None of these papers provide evidence
on aggregate Directional mobility and Mobility as an equalizer of longer-term earn-
ings. Hence, the results that be presented in this dissertation relative to these two
mobility concepts, are new to the literature.
On the study of mobility at the individual level, two papers recently appeared
focusing on conditional and unconditional convergence in earnings over time (see
Antman and Mckenzie, 2005a,b). These are studies for urban Mexico and use the
same data as this dissertation. However, the way they use the data to analyze
mobility is quite different from the route taken here. More precisely, the authors
opted for not using the panel structure of the data, and instead of tracking in-
dividuals over a year, they constructed pseudo-panels by following age-education
cohort groups. The earnings mobility they analyze is therefore between-cohort
mobility. Although their approach has some advantages in getting them a longer
coverage of time (a given cohort can be followed for as many years as there are
surveys), and reducing the potential negative effects of measurement error and at-
trition bias, their method is not without problems. In particular, by tracking the
mobility of cohorts they fail to analyze any intra-cohort mobility that might take
place. Second, one cannot be sure that the mobility experienced by a cohort group
actually represents the true mobility experienced by a given group of individuals.
Problems like migration, deaths, and household dissolution and creation, can lead
to incorrect inferences when this method is applied.
In the light of these studies, the chapter which studies the role of initial earnings
and the determinants of earnings mobility contributes to research in the field by
6There is an ongoing research study on mobility and political outcomes in Mex-
ico by Fernanda Arce and Luis Felipe Lopez Calva.
7focusing on the short-run earnings dynamics experienced by individuals in Mexican
urban areas. It also provides further evidence on the role played by socioeconomic
factors in determining mobility, and interprets the results obtained within the
framework of a structural model of earnings. Finally, that chapter tests the ro-
bustness of the findings to different measures of initial advantage, to measurement
error, and to attrition bias.
Regarding the topic of labor market segmentation, there is a vast literature
studying this issue for Mexico and the world. This literature is reviewed in section
5.2 and the details will not be discussed here. However, it must be said that much
of this literature was based on descriptive statistics that are suggestive at best, or
when a formal structural analysis was performed to test for segmentation, many
of the econometric models did not explicitly separate the decision of the worker
applying for a formal sector job, from the one of the employer hiring the applicant.
The contribution of Chapter 5 is to use the segmentation test proposed in
Pisani and Paga´n (2003) to the Mexican case, and to extend their application by
estimating selectivity-corrected earnings equations. This segmentation test has
the advantage of explicitly modeling the decisions of workers and employers. Also,
the estimation of selectivity-corrected earnings equations helps to generate coun-
terfactual earnings for the individuals rationed out of the formal sector. These
predicted formal sector earnings provide a measure of the potential earnings gains
that these individuals would experience if they were to move to the formal sector.
In addition to that, this chapter exploits the panel structure of the data to provide
evidence on the sectoral transitions and the actual earnings mobility experienced
by individuals who were restricted from entering the formal sector in the initial
period.
81.4 Structure of the Dissertation
The structure of the dissertation is as follows. In Chapter 2 an overall presentation
of the dataset used in this dissertation is made. Chapter 3 contains the analysis
of the aggregate mobility concepts of Directional mobility and Mobility as an
equalizer of longer-term earnings. This is the first substantive chapter in the
dissertation. Chapter 4 contains the model and results analyzing the impact of
initial earnings on mobility and the determinants of earnings mobility. Finally,
Chapter 5 contains the tests of segmentation in labor markets and the evidence of




This dissertation uses data coming from the National Survey of Urban Employment
(in Spanish “Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano”) from now on abbreviated
as ENEU. This is a survey conducted on Mexican urban households with the
purpose of inquiring about the conditions that prevail in urban labor markets. This
chapter introduces the characteristics of the ENEU, and presents some descriptive
statistics for the sample under study. This will provide the reader a panorama of
the evolution of earnings, as well as of the general macroeconomic conditions in
Mexico during the period under study.
2.2 Description of the Survey
As previously mentioned, the ENEU is a survey conducted on Mexican households
with the purpose of inquiring about the conditions that prevail in urban labor
markets. The database is a rotating panel with quarterly data. It tracks individuals
for at most 5 quarters in the most important urban areas of the country. The
sampling is done in three stages, based on a sampling frame of dwellings.
The survey gathers information about socioeconomic characteristics such as
age, gender, education, marital status, labor force participation, labor market
earnings, sector of employment, occupation, type of fringe benefits, hours worked
in the market, as well as hours devoted to other activities (e.g., housework), type
of employment contract, firm size, employment search activity, dwelling charac-
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teristics, etc. The survey is designed to be geographically and socioeconomically
representative of urban Mexico.1 Furthermore, it is one of the surveys used by the
government to create employment statistics.
Although the geographic coverage of the ENEU has expanded substantially
over time, the analysis performed in this dissertation restricts the sample to the
16 cities that originally appeared in the sample of 1987. Doing otherwise might
confound the “true” evolution of mobility measures with the effects caused by the
expansion of the geographical coverage.
As previously mentioned, this is a study on earnings mobility in the short-run.
The short temporal coverage of each panel makes it impossible to draw conclusions
on what happens with earnings mobility in the long-run. However, a long period
of time, that runs from 1987 to 2002, is covered by using many of these short-lived
overlapping panels. These years include several periods of growth and the major
recession following the 1994 Peso crisis. This period also coincides with the years
of trade liberalization in Mexico.2
In the 3rd quarter of 1994 a new questionnaire was applied in the survey, and
although there were minor changes with respect to the previous questionnaire, this
dissertation avoids using the panels in which the individuals questioned experienced
a change in questionnaire.
The unit of analysis in the following chapters is an individual worker. Through-
out the panel individuals are matched according to their household and personal
1By the latter it is meant that the survey stratifies the population according to
wealth. Hence representative results can be obtained for each of these strata.
2Unfortunately, there are no comparable datasets that cover the periods previ-
ous to the beginning of the trade liberalization process. Also, since this process
was a slow and continuous one, it is hard to find a break point which would identify
the impact of the new trade conditions, separately from other factors.
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identification numbers, and also by their age, gender and years of education in
order to minimize the probability of spurious matching.
This dissertation focuses most of its attention to studying one-year earnings
mobility (from the initial interview quarter to the same quarter next year). Since
the survey follows individuals for at most 5 quarters, then at most one observation
of yearly earnings changes exists per individual. This precludes using any panel
data econometric technique. Although there is information available on earnings
at other quarters, studying earnings changes over shorter periods of time (e.g.,
quarterly mobility) is not pursued here. The reason for not doing this, is that a
year is already a short period over which to study mobility. Further extensions to
the present work can include modeling the covariance structure of earnings using
all the 5 periods available for each individual.
The subpopulation of study is restricted to individuals between 25 and 60
years of age. Also, with the exception of Chapter 5, which starts with some cross-
sectional estimates, all the estimations are restricted to individuals who are double-
labor-force participants (i.e., that are in the labor force both in the first interview
and one year later). The reason for applying these restrictions is to avoid having to
analyze the mobility associated with first time entries into the labor force by young
people who recently graduated from school, retirement decisions, and transitions-
in-and-out of the labor force in general. Although this might hide some interesting
effects, like the entrance into the labor force of family members during times of
recessions, it helps focusing the dissertation on the earnings mobility experienced
by workers who are more permanently attached to the labor market. Note however,
that unemployed individuals are included in the analysis. This is done because
finding and/or losing a job is an important event per se, that affects the welfare of
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an individual and it involves a significant change in earnings.
The earnings variable is real earnings measured in 2002 Mexican pesos. The ad-
vantage for using such year as base period, is that back then the nominal exchange
rate between the US Dollar and the Mexican peso was about 10 pesos per dollar,
something which facilitates the interpretation of the results to the international
reader.
Finally, it is important to remark that all the calculations here presented are
weighted estimations using the survey factor weights. This is done in order to
obtain estimates that are more representative at the national urban level. The
author has performed most of these estimations with unweighted data, and the
conclusions reached do not change signinificantly.3 In the unweighted estimations,
the directions of the main parameters of interest remain unchanged, although the
magnitudes of the numbers reported sometimes differ.4 Also, whenever possible
the standard error estimates and statistics calculated are adjusted for the charac-
teristics of the survey design, in particular for clustering and stratification.
The next section presents some descriptive statistics for the main sample under
study in the ENEU, and some data on the macroeconomic evolution of the Mexican
economy. All the calculations presented were performed by the author using the
ENEU surveys, unless explicitly noted.5
3Some of these results are included in Fields et al. (2005). These results will
not be included here in order to avoid doubling the length of this dissertation.
4Due to problems of attrition in the panel sample the weighted mobility esti-
mators are not necessarily representative. Further extensions of this research will
perform the same estimations using post-stratified weights to see if there is any
variation in the conclusions reached.
5The descriptive statistics here presented pertain to the sample used in the
estimations of chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 5 uses a slightly different sample, for
which the descriptive statistics are included in the appendix to that chapter.
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2.3 Descriptive Statistics
The first graph introduced in this section presents the evolution of GDP in Mexico
together with the evolution of average earnings for the sample that will be used for
most of the dissertation. Figure 2.1 shows an upward trend in real GDP during
the years going from 1987 to 1994, when the December Peso crisis hit the economy.
After this crisis, output suffered a sharp downturn, out of which it started rapidly
recovering. Nevertheless, the pre-1994 aggregate output levels were not recovered
until 1999. From 1999 onwards, the Mexican economy continued its growth, but
by 2001-2002 a new recession had started again.
Average earnings followed the steady growth of the economy during the period
going from 1987 to 1994. After the 1994 Peso crisis, earnings fell dramatically.
However, unlike GDP, they did not start their recovery but until much later. It
was only after 1999 that average earnings started growing again, and by 2002
they hadn’t reached yet their pre-1994 level. These graphs serve to illustrate that
earnings did not exactly match the evolution of aggregate output. Instead, three
clear periods can be distinguished in the evolution of earnings. The first period
goes from the 1st quarter of 1987 to the 2nd quarter 1993, the second going from
the 3rd quarter 1994 to the 1st quarter 1999, and the last one going from the 2nd
quarter 1999 to the 4th quarter of 2002. This classification of the evolution of
earnings will become useful later for presenting results in a more compact way, by
pooling panels for these broad periods.
The evolution of earnings inequality in the sample is presented in Figure 2.2,
which depicts the Gini coefficient estimated at the initial interview of the panels.
This picture shows that inequality grew for the first half of the period under study.
































































Source: GDP−INEGI National Accounts, Earnings−author’s calculation based on ENEU’s surveys
































































Figure 2.3: Average Age and Education
The evolution of other characteristics of the sample are plotted in Figures 2.3-
2.5. Figure 2.3 contains information on the average age and education for the
individuals in the sample. It is clear from these pictures that age remained fairly
constant around 37 years of age for the first half of the period, but then increased
afterwards, raising the average age in the sample by 1 year. On the other hand,
education steadily increased from 8 1/2 to 10 years of education by the end of the
sample.
It is important to recall that these numbers pertain to individuals from 25 to
60 years of age who are in the labor force both at the first and the last interview.
Hence, these numbers do not represent the whole labor force.6
6Including all the individuals in the labor force would have the effect of reducing



























Figure 2.4: Fraction of Males
The reader will notice that (with the exception of the GDP graph which comes
from National Accounts statistics), all the other graphs have a break in the mid-
dle, where no data is reported. This will happen with all the figures generated
with the ENEU survey. The break comes from omitting those panels where the
questionnaire changed, and for which no analysis was performed.
Figure 2.4 plots the fraction of males over time in the sample of study. This
fraction is decreasing over time, due to the steady rise in the labor force partici-
pation of women.
Finally, the sectoral and regional composition of the sample are presented in
Figure 2.5. Before analyzing this figure, it is important to clarify how the sector
variables are constructed. In order to classify an individual as being in the formal
or the informal sector, a question in the survey that asks whether the firm at which
the individual worked last week had a name, or whether it was registered with the
authorities, was used. An individual is considered to work in the informal sector
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if he reports that such firm did not have a name, nor it was registered with the
authorities. To cross-check this statement, the individual must have not received
any fringe benefit from this job, like health coverage, housing, social security, etc.
In addition to that, if an individual was a self-declared informal street vendor, or
worked at a firm with less than 6 employees that provided no fringe benefits at all,
then he was also considered to be in the informal sector. The reason for this last
classification choice is that some people might work at an informal firm that has a
name, but no official registration. This is likely to be the case of individuals working
at micro scale firms that provide no coverage to their workers. The classification
into formal and informal sectors is further broken down by whether the individual
is self-employed or a wage worker. There is evidence that wage workers and self-
employed can differ dramatically in their characteristics (see for instance Maloney,
1999).
Figure 2.5, shows that approximately 70% of the individuals in the sample
are formal wage workers, 20% are informal self-employed, around 8% are informal
wage workers, and a very small remaining fraction are unemployed and formal
self-employed. The low fraction of unemployed individuals in the sample is a
known feature of the Mexican labor markets. In general, unemployment is low in
Mexico, because there are no institutions that can cover a long search period for
an individual who suddenly loses a job. Furthermore, the unemployment rate in
this sub-sample of middle-aged workers seems to be lower than the unemployment
rate of the overall urban population which is around 3.5%. Notice that all these










































Figure 2.5: Sectoral and Regional Composition
Regarding the regional composition of the sample, most of the individuals in-
cluded come from Mexico City (less than 60%), while the North and the Center
regions in the country represent approximately 20% each. Finally, the US Border
cities and the South region represent a small fraction of the sample. As previously
mentioned, the ENEU expanded its geographic coverage over time, but this study
focuses only on the present in the 1987 survey, in order to avoid confounding ef-
fects from expanding such coverage. The list of cities included under each region
appears on the appendix at the end of the chapter, together with the number of
observations contained in each panel.
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2.4 Attrition and Non-response in the Survey
This section provides a descriptive look at the problem of missing individuals and
non-reporting in the panel. Figure 2.6 displays the number of missing individuals
in the panel after one year, as a fraction of the potential population of interest. It
is evident from the graph that around half of the potential population is missing
from the panel after one year. This is a high number and raises serious concerns
about the representativeness of any mobility study performed with the ENEU. The
bottom two graphs plot the reasons why individuals are not included in the sample.
The list of possible reasons include attrition (i.e., disappearing from the sample in
further re-interviews), mismatch according to variables of gender, age and educa-
tion, missing earnings information, missing dwellings information,7 missing sector
information, and outliers in the earnings variables.8
From these graphs it is clear that the main reason for missing individuals from
the sample is attrition. The fact that the ENEU tracks dwellings and not house-
holds explains part of this high attrition. It is important to note that the peak of
attrition found around 1988-89 is of a different nature than the attrition present
at other years. In these years it was not that an exceptionally high number of
individuals were leaving their households, but rather that entire households were
not matchable over the panel years. Perhaps there was an undocumented change
in the areas surveyed in the panel, or there could be mistakes in the coding of
household identification numbers. In any case, this extra peak in attrition is less
7Relevant only after the third quarter of 1994 when the dwelling questionnaire
was introduced.
8An individual was considered to have earnings beyond the normal if for a single
month it reported having earned more than 30,000 US Dollars, and reports much
smaller amounts in other interviews.
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worrisome as it is unlikely to be driven by economic reasons, and it probably does
not generate much bias in the estimates. Besides attrition, the other categories
more relevant for the exclusion of individuals from the sample are missing earnings
reports, missing dwelling characteristics, and mismatches.
The demographic characteristics for the missing individuals are presented in
Figure 2.7.9 This figure shows that there is a clear difference in the demographic
characteristics of individuals who are missing because of attrition and mismatches,
and the ones missing due to non-reporting of earnings. Overall, the latter are more
educated, older, have a higher fraction of males, and have higher earnings.10
A comparison of Figure 2.7 with Figures 2.1-2.5 shows that the attritors do not
differ much in their characteristics from the individuals included in the sample;
however, non-reporters have substantial differences. This is a cause of concern,
because if educated high-income individuals are not reporting their earnings when
they experience positive mobility, then the mobility analysis in this dissertation
could become biased.
9In the previous figure the categories were not exclusive, i.e., an individual could
be mismatched and also not report earnings. For the present graph the categories
are exclusive. This means that for an individual with multiple causes for being
excluded from the sample, he will be first classified as an attritor (if he is one),
and if he is not priority is then given to mismatch and finally to non reporting.
Also notice that this figure only includes the main categories for missing.
10Most of the individuals who do not report earnings, do so at one point in time
only. Hence, the earnings plotted for such individuals are either the earnings at
the year before or at the year after, depending on when they refused to answer.
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Note: Initial earnings, except for individuals missing initial earnings
Earnings for Missing Individuals
Figure 2.7: Demographic Characteristics of Missing Individuals
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2.5 Final Remarks
This chapter introduced the survey used in this dissertation, as well some descrip-
tive statistics for the sample that will be studied in the mobility analysis.
The sample under study is mostly composed of middle-aged males coming from
Mexico city, working in the formal sector as wage workers with an average educa-
tion at the high school level. However, it is also shown that some variables like
education and gender composition present evolving trends: the education level of
the sample increases, and there is also an increased participation of women in the
labor force.
Regarding the macroeconomic evolution of the Mexican economy, it is shown
that total output has risen, but the period under study contains a severe crisis
that occurred in December 1994, and that created a sharp downturn in aggregate
production.
The evolution of average earnings is growing in the period that goes from 1987
to 1994, but in the aftermath of the 1994 Peso crisis, earnings fell for the following
4 years, i.e., earnings continued falling even after total output had started growing
back again. The most recent period from 1999 onwards witnessed an increase in
average earnings, but this growth was not enough to match the pre-1994 levels.
Finally, earnings inequality in the sample under study increased in the first half of
the period (from 1987 to 1994) and remained steady in the following periods.
The amount of attrition and non-reporting of the earnings variable is quite
large. While attritors have similar characteristics to the individuals that remained
in the panel, this is not the case for the individuals who fail to report their earnings
at some point in time. The latter are usually older and more educated than
the average individual in the sample. Also, there is a higher fraction of males
24
among the “non-reporters” and, whenever these individuals reported earnings,
these were higher than the average earnings of individuals in the sample. For all
these reasons, the earnings mobility results presented in chapters 3 and 4 should
not be generalized to the whole urban population without further research on the
impact of attrition on the estimates.
The next chapter contains the study of aggregate mobility trends for several
groups of the population.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Regions and their Cities
City Region
















































This chapter presents the analysis of indices of aggregate earnings mobility. In
particular, it focuses in studying two mobility concepts: Directional mobility and
Mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes. As it will be argued below, these
two concepts are particularly interesting from a normative point of view. Their
analysis is also a good starting point in grasping the evolution of aggregate trends
in earnings mobility for the Mexican economy.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 motivates the chapter, while
section 3.3 reviews the literature. The methodology utilized in this paper is ex-
plained in section 3.4, and results follow in sections 3.5-3.5.3. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Motivation
The study of aggregate earnings mobility, also known as “macromobility”, has a
long tradition in Economics. Actually, it is with this approach that the mobility
literature started in both Economics and Sociology. The reason for this lies in the
fact that it was easier to calculate these indices when there were limited data and
the computational resources to process these data were poor.
Aggregate mobility indices provide answers to the generic question “How much
mobility of a certain type takes place in the economy?”. This question is usually
analyzed for different mobility concepts, and for different groups of the population.
Broadly speaking, the different aggregate mobility indices can be considered as
27
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quantifying 6 different mobility concepts. These are: Time dependence, Positional
mobility, Share mobility, Symmetric mobility, Directional mobility and Mobility
as an equalizer of longer-term incomes (for a detailed discussion of these concepts
see Fields, 2004a).
Time dependence studies the mobility of how “one’s current economic position
is determined by one’s position in the past” (Fields, 2001, p.107). Actually, Time
dependence is concerned not only with the intertemporal relationship between
economic positions, but also with the relationship between levels of income (or
earnings).1 Since the relationship between changes in earnings and initial earnings
levels is studied in the following chapter at the individual level, the study of this
concept is not pursued here.
The study of Positional mobility is concerned, as its name indicates, with the
study of the changes in positions in the income distribution experienced by a group
of economic agents. The unappealing side of this concept is that many interesting
mobility processes can occur without properly implying any positional mobility.
Consider for instance the hypothetical mobility process referred to in footnote 1,
or another one in which everybody’s income is increased by x pesos. In both
cases there is no positional mobility, even when the agents in these economies
experienced substantial changes in their incomes.
The concept of Share mobility is concerned with the study of changes in the
shares of individual incomes as a proportion of the overall income level of the pop-
ulation. The problem with this approach is that a proportionate income change
1To appreciate the difference between these two cases consider the hypothetical
situation in which $1 was given to the poorest individual, $2 to second poorest,
and so on. Then, in this economy there would be no mobility in terms of positions,
but the time dependence of levels of income would change, because people with
different initial levels experienced different mobility patterns.
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(i.e., where everybody’s income is multiplied by a positive factor κ) would not be
considered as mobility, even when the income levels might have changed signifi-
cantly.
The first two mobility concepts (together with positional Time dependence)
capture closely the idea of relative movements of incomes. Although, it is important
to acknowledge that from a welfare perspective, individuals care not only about
the changes in their absolute income levels, but also about the changes in their
relative positions in society, it is not clear to the author that any of the indices used
in the literature measure the relative mobility that the individual might actually
care about.2
The only mobility concept of relative content that will be analyzed in this dis-
sertation is Mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes. This concept answers
the question “Does the mobility experienced in the economy help in equalizing the
incomes of the individuals over time?”. In particular, it captures one of the earli-
est concerns of the economists interested in mobility: whether the mobility process
that takes place over time reduces the initial inequality that was observed in the
economy (see Fields, 2004a, for a discussion of this concept and a new method
to appraise it). If lifetime incomes are less unequally distributed than the initial
ones, then it will be said that mobility equalized longer-term incomes. For the
case of the present application, the data under study does not contain a measure
of lifetime earnings (since the panel data used only tracks individuals for one year).
However, this concept can still be applied to the Mexican case in order to assess
to what extent the accumulated mobility over a year equalized the earnings of the
2In order to do that, it would be necessary to know to whom the individual is
comparing herself, information which clearly is not collected in most of the surveys.
For an interesting discussion of these issues see Frank (1992).
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individuals initially observed.
Turning now to concepts of absolute mobility, the concept of Symmetric mobil-
ity measures how much incomes change in an economy without regard to whether
these changes are gains or losses. Because of this insensitivity to the direction of
the mobility experienced, this concept is not studied here. Instead, Directional mo-
bility is studied. The concept of Directional mobility answers the question “What
are the earnings gains and losses in the economy?”. As its name indicates, this
concept has the normative appealing feature that is sensitive to both the magni-
tude and the direction (gains or losses) of changes in income. If an individual gains
an extra amount of income she will be considered to be better-off than before, in-
dependently of what happened to the incomes of the rest of the individuals in the
economy. The opposite will be said in the case of an income loss.
3.3 Previous Research and Contribution
An overview of the literature on aggregate earnings mobility lies outside the scope
of this section. A good introduction to the numerous indices developed in this
literature and the mobility concepts they try to capture can be found in Fields
and Ok (1999a) and Fields (2001). Instead, this section will discuss some of the
references for the methodologies used in this chapter, as well as briefly overview
some of the previous studies relevant to Mexico and other developing economies.
As previously mentioned, the questions of aggregate mobility in general take the
form of “how much mobility is there,” for a given mobility concept. The answers
to such questions are usually provided by means of some index or other methods
like transition matrices and stochastic dominance methods. Because calculating
measures of aggregate mobility required less data than other mobility studies (like
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the ones dealt with in the following chapter), this area was tackled empirically
early on. However, most of the research focused on measuring concepts of relative
mobility; see Fields and Ok (1999a) for a survey.
The measurement of Directional mobility can be done in several ways. One
simple way to approach it is by means of averages of earnings changes, both in
levels and logs, for the the overall population and for several subgroups of it.
The axiomatic properties of these indices are presented in Fields and Ok (1999b).
Other possible methods include the comparison of the cumulative distribution
functions (cdf’s) of earnings changes in order to test for stochastic dominance (for
an application to the mobility literature see Fields et al. (2002)), or the analysis
of discrete transitions in-and-out of absolute income categories.
The first attempts trying to capture the concept of Mobility as an equalizer of
longer-term incomes were made by Shorrocks (1978) and Chakravarty et al. (1985).
The Shorrocks index has been criticized for having unappealing properties as to
how it ranks mobility processes (see for instance Benabou and Ok, 2001; Fields,
2004a). An alternative measure of this mobility concept is the one offered by
Fields (2004a). This measure has the properties that it is negative when mobility
disequalizes incomes and positive when it equalizes them, relative to the initial
distribution.3
Among recent empirical papers on mobility on developed countries present-
ing evidence of Directional mobility, one finds Buchinsky et al. (2003) and Fields
(2004c) for France and the US. Among their conclusions are that Directional mo-
bility presented a ”saw-tooth pattern” in the US from the seventies to the early
3The Chakravarty-Dutta-Weymark (CDW) index is similar in nature to the
Fields index if one replaces their ‘hypothetical’ income distribution path with the
distribution at the initial period.
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nineties, while in France it first rose considerably and then fell in the late seventies,
stabilizing thereafter at a lower level.4 When looking at mobility by population
groups in France, the authors find that there are no significant differences by
gender, and that individuals with higher education experienced higher positive
mobility.
For developing countries the stories vary depending on the economic evolution
of each country, and many times evidence on Directional mobility is presented only
indirectly. This means that specific measures of this concept are not systematically
calculated, but rather presented as a complement to other topics studied. An
example are the numerous studies presenting evidence of the transitions in-and-
out of (absolute) poverty. Clearly, such evidence provides results on Directional
mobility. However, limiting the analysis to a discretization of the data (above
and below the poverty line) leaves unaddressed many of the details that could be
learned if the mobility across the whole distribution was studied.
Among the studies in Latin America that explicitly address Directional mobility
one can find Herrera (1999) and Glewwe and Hall (1998) for Peru, Freije (2001) for
Venezuela, and Sa´nchez-Puerta (2005) for Argentina. For Peru, there was positive
mobility in the late eighties. Among the factors positively correlated with this
upward mobility were the individual’s education level and age. For Venezuela, a
trend of impoverishment is found through the eighties and nineties. Households
with higher human capital endowments (and hence usually with higher income too)
tend to experience larger gains and losses than the rest of the population, but these
changes are proportional to their initial income levels. Finally, for Argentina there
4Further analysis for the US presented in Fields (2001) by means of stochastic
dominance analysis shows that in the 1980’s more people lost more dollars than in
the previous decades, but the winners, won more than before.
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was a falling trend in earnings over the past decade, and age, gender and education
do not seem to play a major role in explaining this mobility, except during the
crisis of early 2000, when higher education was negatively associated with earnings
changes and women fared slightly better than men. Of course, it is crucial to keep
in mind that these results only describe the mobility experienced by subgroups of
the population and do not constitute evidence of causal determination.5
The empirical evidence on Mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes is
more conclusive in the sense that in general, both for developed and developing
nations, mobility equalizes longer-term incomes. Either by means of explicit indices
or by simple comparisons of inequality indices calculated over lifetime incomes
versus their cross-sectional counterparts, this finding appears to be consistent for
most of the studies.
Only a couple of papers have studied aggregate mobility issues for Mexico. The
studies by Wodon (2001) and Yitzhaki and Wodon (2002) study time-dependence
in the ranks of the individuals, the first comparing urban Mexico and Argentina,
the second in rural Mexico. The first paper studies how one particular measure of
time-dependence in ranks -the Gini Index of Mobility- evolves in both countries
over different points of the business cycle. The study uses the same database
as the present dissertation and covers from the late eighties to the mid-nineties.
Among its main findings are that in Mexico there is less time-dependence during
growth periods, while the opposite occurs for the case of Argentina. According
to the author Mexican labor markets adjusted to negative macroeconomic shocks
through price adjustments (i.e., wage cuts), while in Argentina they adjusted by
5Another grouping generally explored when analyzing Directional mobility is
the quintile of the initial income distribution. Results pertaining to this analysis
are commented in the next chapter.
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means of changes in quantities (rise in unemployment). Since labor cuts are likely
to lead to more re-ranking of individuals along the earnings distribution than wage
cuts, Argentina experienced less time-dependence in ranks during the downturns
of its economy. Another interesting finding is that young uneducated workers
experience less time-dependence than the rest of the population.
The paper by Yitzhaki and Wodon (2002) uses a dataset collected by the World
Bank and the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. This dataset was related to the rural
subsidies program PROCAMPO. The study was conducted in rural areas in Mexico
in 1994 and 1997. This mobility study analyzes time-dependence in ranks using
again the Gini Index of Mobility for four welfare measures: Per-capita income, per-
capita land owned, per-capita land cultivated and PROCAMPO transfers. Among
the findings of these authors are that, in general, time-dependence in ranks is
quite high in these rural samples, meaning that individuals preserve their ranks
over time. They also find that the time-dependence is smaller with land measures
as proxies of welfare than with per-capita income. Finally, they report that the
PROCAMPO transfers had the effect of providing a limited re-ranking in the
distribution.
As previously mentioned, both of these papers focus on time-dependence in
ranks only, hence the evidence on aggregate Directional mobility and Mobility as
an equalizer of longer-term earnings presented in this dissertation is new to the
literature. Also, the decomposition of the measure of Mobility as an equalizer of
longer-term incomes in between and within-group components is, as far as I know,
new in the literature.
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3.4 Methodology
The measurement of Directional mobility can be done in several ways. Two popular
methods used in the literature are the estimation of the average gains (and losses)
experienced by a group of individuals, and the use of stochastic dominance analysis
over the distributions of income changes. Since in this dissertation Directional
mobility is quantified for several subpopulation groups and for 56 overlapping
panels, the first method is preferred for its compactness. One disadvantage of
taking this route is that, by taking averages, the amount of mobility could be
understated, because positive and negative changes would cancel each other out.6
In principle, performing this analysis for different subgroups of the population
should reduce this problem, but does not completely eliminate it. It is important
to keep this caveat in mind for the rest of this chapter.
Denoting by yit the monthly earnings of individual i at time t, the two indices






(yit − yit−1) (3.1)






(ln yit − ln yit−1) (3.2)
where i ∈ s, and s is an arbitrary subgroup of the population of size Ns (it might
be the overall population as well).7
6The comparison of distributions of earnings changes does not suffer from this
problem.
7For the case of (3.2) the calculations are performed only for individuals working
and reporting positive earnings.
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The reason for analyzing average log-earnings changes, in addition to changes
in levels, is that the former measure gives higher weight to the earnings mobility of
individuals at the bottom of the earnings distribution. In general, the initially poor
will experience less downward mobility simply because they had a smaller initial
income. Taking logarithms and their change is a partial solution to this problem,
because it gives a higher weight to the earnings changes of the poor, and approx-
imates proportional changes in earnings. The index m¯s has been axiomatized by
Fields and Ok (1999b).
Regarding the concept of Mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes the
index used is the one proposed by Fields (2004a). This index has the properties of
being: (i) decreasing in the inequality of long-term incomes, (ii) increasing in the
inequality of initial incomes, and (iii) equal to zero if these two inequality measures
are equal, i.e., if mobility did not bring a change in the inequality in the economy
over the long-run.
The particular functional form of this index is
P¯ = 1− I(y¯)
I(y·t−1)
(3.3)
where I(·) is a measure of inequality, y¯ is a vector of individual average earnings
(the average being taken over time for each individual), and y·t−1 is the vector of
initial earnings. If mobility (dis)equalizes longer-term earnings, the index will be
(negative)positive, otherwise it will be zero. Other indices have been proposed in
the literature to measure this mobility concept. In particular the index proposed by
Shorrocks (1978) has been commonly applied however, as was previously mentioned
recent research has found unappealing properties in this index and hence it won’t
be used here.
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The concept of Mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes is often consid-
ered as being equivalent to a reduction in inequality in the economy (as measured
by the changes in an inequality index). A simple example borrowed from Fields
(2004a) will demonstrate that this is not the case. Consider a 2-person economy
in which the incomes of the individuals conforming it are represented by a vector
(y1, y2). The first entry in the vector always corresponds to the income of person 1,
and the second entry to the one of person 2. Suppose furthermore that the specific
initial incomes are given by (1,5). Now consider two scenarios,
Period 1 Period 2
Scenario I: (1,5) (1,6)
Scenario II: (1,5) (6,1)
Under both scenarios inequality grew (the Gini index in Period 1 is 0.33, while
in Period 2 equals 0.35), however Scenario I disequalized longer-term incomes (the
“longer-term” incomes being just the averages over time for each individual). In-
deed, the Gini index for the vector of longer-term incomes (1,5.5), is 0.34. On
the other hand, Scenario II equalized longer-term incomes, since they are (3.5,3),
with an associated Gini index of 0.03. This example demonstrates that inequal-
ity, when measured cross-sectionally, can grow and still the mobility process can
equalize longer-term incomes.
The inequality measure used in this dissertation for the P-index will be the
Generalized Entropy index with parameter α = 2, or GE(2) (this equals half the
squared coefficient of variation). The reason for selecting this index (instead of
the more popular Gini index) is that it is Lorenz-consistent, it allows for earnings
to take values equal to zero, and unlike the Gini, it is decomposable in inequality
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between groups and inequality within groups for some groups of the population.8
An inequality index that is decomposable into between and within-group in-
equality components can be written as
I(y) = ωwIw(y) + ωbIb(y)
where y is the vector of incomes, Iw and Ib are the within and between-group
inequality indices, and ωw and ωb are their respective weights (which can equal 1,
as in the case of the GE(2)).
In this dissertation, a similar decomposition is proposed for the P-index. In
particular, a simple algebraic manipulation shows that the P-index can be written
as
P = κwPw + κbPb
where Pw = 1 − (Iw(y¯)/Iw(y·t−1)) and Pb = 1 − (Ib(y¯)/Ib(y·t−1)) are the in-
dices capturing whether mobility helped in equalizing longer-term incomes within
and between groups of the population respectively. The κ-weights equal κb =
ωbIb(y·t−1)/I(y·t−1) and κw = ωwIw(y·t−1)/I(y·t−1). In the case of an index having
weights ωw = ωb = 1 (such as the GE(2)) the κ-weights are just the between
and within-group base period inequalities, as fractions of the total initial inequal-
ity. This decomposition will be useful in answering the questions “Does mobility
equalize earnings within groups over time?” and “Does mobility equalize earnings
between groups over time?” when the analysis by groups of the population is
performed.
Having presented the main indices used in this chapter to capture aggregate
earnings mobility, the next section presents the results obtained for urban Mexico.




3.5.1 Initial advantage by subpopulation group
Before presenting the results for the different mobility measures previously de-
scribed, this section provides evidence on which subgroups of the population ex-
perience higher initial earnings, something considered to be a measure of initial
advantage.
Figure 3.1 contains the initial average earnings profiles for individuals grouped
by quintiles of the initial earnings distribution. Although in this case the ordering
of who earns more is trivially determined by construction, the figure illustrates how
big are the differences in earnings across different points in the earnings distribu-
tion. In particular, this graph shows the large differential in earnings between the
individuals in the top quintile and the rest of the population. While the earnings
of the first 4 quintiles are between 1000 and 5000 Mx pesos a month, the earnings
of the individuals in the 5th quintile is usually above the 10000 Mx pesos. The
picture on the right shows the F-statistic for the hypothesis test that earnings are
equal between groups, together with the critical value of the F distribution at the
95-percentile. It is clear from the graph that this hypothesis is rejected.
The second group analyzed is age groups. For this purpose the population is
divided into three age groups. The first group contains individuals between 25 and
36 years of age, the second, individuals between 37 and 48 years, and the last one
contains the individuals with age between 49 and 60 years. Figure 3.2 shows there
is no clear advantage in terms of initial earnings for any of these age groups. If
anything, the middle-aged group (going from 37 to 48 years) seems to have slightly





















































Equality Hypothesis Test by Quintile Group
Figure 3.1: Initial Earnings by Quintile Group
that earnings are most of the times roughly equal among age groups.
For the analysis of education groups, the population was divided into individ-
uals with Elementary (0 to 6 years of schooling), Secondary (7 to 12 yrs.) and
Higher education (12 or more yrs. of education). The results in Figure 3.3 present
a clear ranking of individuals, where individuals with more education have higher
initial earnings. The individuals with higher education earn at least twice as much
as the ones with secondary education, and these in turn earn about 1.3 times what
the individuals with elementary education do. All these differences are statistically
significant, as the second graph shows.
Figure 3.4 presents the results for gender categories. The initial advantage in
terms of earnings favors male individuals which earn about 1500 Mx Pesos more
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Equality Hypothesis Test by Age Group
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Equality Hypothesis Test by Education Group
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Equality Hypothesis Test by Gender
Figure 3.4: Initial Earnings by Gender
confirms that this difference is statistically significant for all the periods in the
sample.
Regarding the initial earnings of individuals in different sectors, Figure 3.5
shows that the earnings of formal self-employed are substantially higher than those
of anyone else. The graph also shows that the earnings of formal wage workers
and informal self-employed are roughly the same. At the bottom of the earnings
distribution stand the informal wage workers which earn almost half of what their
informal self-employed counterparts do, confirming the intuition that they are the
worst-off individuals among the sector categories. Again the hypothesis test of
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Equality Hypothesis Test by Sector














































Equality Hypothesis Test by Region
Figure 3.6: Initial Earnings by Region
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Finally, the initial earnings by region plotted in Figure 3.6 show that individ-
uals located in cities along the US Border have larger earnings on average, while
individuals living in the South present usually the lowest earnings. The hypothesis
of equality of earnings among regions is rejected most of the times.
3.5.2 Directional Mobility
Having presented which subgroups of the population have a higher initial advan-
tage in terms of average earnings, this section proceeds to present the results on
the indices of Directional mobility for the whole sample, and for the previously
analyzed groups. Again, the measures analyzed are average earnings mobility in
levels and logarithms.
The average mobility for all the individuals in the sample, both in levels and
logarithms is plotted in Figure 3.7.9 In this figure it is possible to see that the
average mobility during the first half of the sample was most of the times zero,
with the exception of moderate growth in average earnings and log-earnings during
the late eighties. After the 1994 Peso crisis there was a strong downfall in earnings,
and positive mobility occurred again only in the early 2000. Finally, the last years
on the sample show small negative mobility in levels.
Concerning the earnings mobility for individuals at different quintiles of the
initial earnings distribution Figure 3.8 shows that the higher the initial advantage,
the higher is the loss suffered (or the smallest the gain). This conclusion holds
independently of whether one looks at absolute earnings changes or proportional
earnings changes (as approximated by the change in log-earnings). Individuals in
9This figure also includes 95% confidence intervals to indicate when these esti-
























































Log−Earnings Change 95% ci
Log−Earnings Change
Figure 3.7: Average Earnings Mobility
the higher quintile experience considerable earnings losses over a year, even after
accounting for the fact that they started at a higher position and hence had literally
“more to lose”. The result that individuals in the lowest initial quintile always
experience the highest gains is not driven by the fact that this group contains
unemployed individuals in the base period. This is because the unemployed are a
small fraction of the sample.10 All these findings provide support for the fact that
there is some mean reversion in the earnings of the individuals in the short run, a
topic that will be studied more carefully in the next chapter.
When looking at the earnings mobility by age and education groups in Figures
3.9 and 3.10, no clear pattern seems to emerge. In the case of age, the earnings
mobility looks the same for the different subgroups, and the hypothesis tests of
equality of mobility by groups fail to reject this hypothesis most of the times. The
same occurs for the education groups considered. The earnings mobility in levels
of the most educated individuals fluctuates more, but the graph of log-earnings
changes confirms that these higher fluctuations are due only to the fact that this




































































































Equality Hypothesis Test by Quintile Group
Figure 3.8: Average Mobility by Quintile Group
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group has a higher level of earnings. In any case, the hypothesis tests fail to
reject most of the times the equality of mobility for the different education groups.
In other words higher levels of education are not associated with more positive
mobility.
Regarding the earnings changes by gender one can observe that the earnings
mobility experienced by men and women is pretty similar, with the exception of
the aftermath of the 1994 Peso crisis when men experienced significantly higher
losses in absolute levels. However, as the logarithms graph shows, these losses were
proportional to the higher earnings men had before the crisis started.
Figure 3.12 shows, no clear mobility pattern emerges by region, neither in
levels nor in logarithms. In both cases the hypothesis tests of equality of mobility
patterns by region fail to reject such hypotheses.
The mobility analysis by sector shows that the unemployed individuals ex-
perienced the largest gains (since most of them found jobs), while the formal
self-employed (who were the initially most advantaged in terms of earnings) expe-
rienced the largest losses. This indicates that part of the large initial advantage
of the formal self-employed vanished after a year. The informal self-employed and
the formal wage workers experienced on average the same mobility. The analysis
of the log-mobility patterns confirms the results found in levels, and adds to the
picture the fact that informal wage workers (who usually have the lowest earnings)
are the ones who experience the largest proportional gains. The hypotheses tests
performed reject the equality of mobility between sectors most of the times.11
The study of Directional mobility by sector can be refined by showing the
11It is important to remark that this hypothesis test for the mobility in lev-
els excludes the unemployed. Including them would lead to over-rejection of the
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Equality Hypothesis Test by Gender





























Mexico City US Border
North Center
South
















































Mexico City US Border
North Center
South



















Equality Hypothesis Test by Region






























Formal Worker Informal Self−emp
Formal Self−emp



















































Informal Worker Informal Self−emp
Formal Self−emp Formal Worker


















Equality Hypothesis Test by Sector
Figure 3.13: Average Mobility by Initial Sector
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mobility by sector transitions. Due to the fact that certain sector transitions have
very few observations on any single year, a year-by-year comparison of the mobility
measures would give very unreliable estimates. For this reason several periods are
pooled together according to the main trends experienced by average earnings in
the economy, previously identified in Chapter 2. To recall, these periods are from
the 1st quarter of 1987 to the 2nd quarter of 1993, from the 3rd quarter of 1994 to
the 1st quarter of 1999, and finally from the 2nd quarter of 1999 to the 4th quarter
of 2002.
The results by sector transition are shown in Tables 3.1-3.3. These tables show
that becoming an informal wage worker is the worst in terms of mobility (after
moving into unemployment, of course), while moving into formal self-employment
is associated with the largest positive gains (and/or smallest losses). Most of the
times movements into informal self-employment appear to bring larger gains (and
smaller losses) than movements into formal wage work, but the differences are not
large and this conclusion changes depending on whether means or medians are
considered, and on the period under consideration. In particular, in the aftermath
of the 1994 Peso crisis many times transitions into formal wage work are associated
with less negative mobility than the ones into informal self-employment. Lacking
direct measures of capital in the survey, it is hard to know whether what self-
employed individuals report as earnings are the return to labor only, or whether
they also include the returns to capital. The analysis of log-mobility patterns in
Tables 3.1 and 3.3 leads to similar conclusions to the ones in levels.
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Table 3.1: Average Earnings Mobility by Sector Transitions. All Periods.
Levels Logarithms
Mean Std.Dev. Median Mean Std.Dev. Median
Unemployed to Unemployed 0.0 0.0 0.0
Unemployed to Informal Worker 2249.8 1317.0 1906.4
Unemployed to Informal Self-emp 3807.4 4030.2 2633.0
Unemployed to Formal Self-emp 21576.8 14694.4 24339.2
Unemployed to Formal Worker 3859.3 3407.3 2866.1
Informal Worker to Unemployed -2508.7 1773.9 -2144.9
Informal Worker to Informal Worker -52.3 1988.5 -49.1 -0.011 0.528 -0.031
Informal Worker to Informal Self-emp 763.4 2881.5 354.5 0.187 0.723 0.144
Informal Worker to Formal Self-emp 4396.1 5473.0 4063.9 0.716 0.681 0.926
Informal Worker to Formal Worker 327.9 1983.3 206.6 0.138 0.539 0.091
Informal Self-emp to Unemployed -3810.5 4128.2 -2918.4
Informal Self-emp to Informal Worker -939.0 5592.3 -359.6 -0.190 0.732 -0.167
Informal Self-emp to Informal Self-emp -135.6 6073.1 -79.0 -0.020 0.784 -0.040
Informal Self-emp to Formal Self-emp 3387.4 14717.2 1629.3 0.272 0.915 0.252
Informal Self-emp to Formal Worker -652.3 6228.0 -30.5 0.011 0.809 0.003
Formal Self-emp to Unemployed -10636.8 6919.7 -6791.8
Formal Self-emp to Informal Worker -3107.4 8210.7 -1185.8 -0.487 0.915 -0.254
Formal Self-emp to Informal Self-emp -2405.9 15038.6 -1131.5 -0.226 0.905 -0.156
Formal Self-emp to Formal Self-emp -518.8 22926.4 -628.2 -0.011 0.872 -0.058
Formal Self-emp to Formal Worker -2985.7 14091.2 -2266.2 -0.279 0.808 -0.254
Formal Worker to Unemployed -4986.6 5781.4 -3222.5
Formal Worker to Informal Worker -197.6 2227.5 -116.7 -0.078 0.546 -0.058
Formal Worker to Informal Self-emp 418.9 6064.0 103.3 0.003 0.733 0.029
Formal Worker to Formal Self-emp 2421.3 15522.4 1645.8 0.219 0.911 0.189



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.5.3 Mobility as an Equalizer of Longer-Term Earnings
This section presents the results of the calculations of the P-index of Mobility as
an equalizer of longer-term earnings for the whole sample and subgroups of the
population.
In Figure 3.14 the P-index as described by equation (3.3) is plotted. The index
is calculated according to two inequality measures, namely the Gini index and
the Generalized Entropy index with coefficient 2 (GE(2)), which equals half the
squared coefficient of variation. Although the two P-indices that arise from these
calculations (denoted from now on PGini and PGE(2)) have very different scales,
they both indicate that during the years under study mobility equalized earnings.
These two indices show a roughly constant pattern, but around different levels
(the PGE(2) shows higher equalization, but higher fluctuations too). Only during a
couple of periods in the sample the conclusions of the indices differ. During the late
eighties the PGE(2) shows that mobility was disequalizing, while the PGini shows the
opposite. Since the PGE(2) coefficient has the advantage of being decomposable into
within and between-group components, the analysis in this section will continue
analyzing only this index for the different subgroups of the population.
Figure 3.15 plots the P-index by initial quintile groups. The graph contains
both the within and between-group components, as well as their shares (i.e., κwPw
and κbPb). The conclusion stemming from this graph is that in general earnings
mobility helped in reducing between and within-quintile longer-term earnings in-
equality. However, whenever the overall mobility process is disequalizing this effect
comes from disequalizations in earnings within-quintiles. In the next chapter, it
will be shown that this equalization of longer-term earnings between groups occurs














































































P−Index Shares by Quintile Group

































































































P−Index Shares by Education Group







































































































P−Index Shares by Region
Figure 3.17: P-index by Gender and Region
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The analysis of the P-index by age and education groups shows that mobility
equalized longer-term earnings within groups; while its effect in the the between-
group inequality is sometimes equalizing and sometimes disequalizing. However,
when weighted by their respective weights, the equalization that took place within-
groups has a dominating effect, giving the overall pattern of equalization previously
noted for the entire population.
The analysis of Mobility as an equalizer of longer-term earnings by gender
presents some interesting results. In Figure 3.17 it can be seen that while it is
still true that earnings mobility helped equalize the longer-term earnings within
each gender, its effect led to stronger earnings inequality between men and women
over time. Again, once the weights of each effect are taken into account, the
equalization that took place within-genders dominates the disequalization that
occurred between the earnings of men and women.
Finally, in the case of earnings mobility by region, the conclusions are similar
to the education and age group cases. Earnings mobility equalizes longer-term
earnings within regions, while sometimes equalizes and other disequalizes longer-
term earnings between regions, the former effect being the dominating one.
Unlike the concept of directional mobility, the analysis of mobility as an equal-
izer of longer-term earnings was not performed by initial sectors, because there
were not enough observations in the all categories as to obtain reliable estimates
of the within-group inequality indices.
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3.6 Conclusions
This chapter studied two groups of aggregate mobility questions, namely:
1)“What are the average earnings gains and losses in the economy?” and “Are
these earnings mobility patterns the same for different groups of the population?”
2)“Does mobility equalize earnings over time?”, “Does mobility equalize earn-
ings within groups over time?” and “Does mobility equalize earnings between
groups over time?”
The answer to the first question is that on average earnings mobility fluctuated
around zero, with the exception of the late eighties and the early 2000s, when
individuals experienced upward mobolity, and the years following the 1994 Peso
crisis that were associated with large earnings losses. These findings occur both in
levels of earnings, as well as in logarithms.
The analysis by subgroups of the population shows that mobility differs only
by initial earnings quintile groups and by sector. In both cases, the group with
higher initial earnings (the fifth-quintile and the formal self-employed, respectively)
experienced the largest losses, both in absolute and proportional terms. Similarly,
the group that had the smallest initial earnings (the first-quintile, and both the
unemployed and the informal wage workers) experienced the largest gains.
Age, education, gender and region groups, did not present major differences
among themselves in Directional mobility over time. In general, more educated
individuals experienced larger fluctuations in their earnings, and together with
males they experienced larger losses after the Peso crisis. However, these differences
disappear once their initial earnings level is accounted for, i.e. their higher mobility
is proportional to their higher initial earnings level.
The answer to the second set of questions is that mobility helped in equalizing
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earnings for most of the periods studied. Only during a couple of periods in the
late eighties mobility acted to disequalize earnings over time. It is interesting to
note that it was during this same period that earnings were growing fast.
Another finding was that in general mobility helped equalize within-group
longer-term earnings, while its role regarding between-group inequality was some-
times equalizing and sometimes disequalizing. However, in most of the cases the
equalization at the the within-group level dominated the other one. The only
exception to this finding occurred when initial earnings quintile groups were ana-
lyzed. In this case, earnings mobility helped equalize between-group longer-term
earnings. One interesting finding was that earnings mobility almost always in-
creased the inequality between the longer-term earnings of men and women, but
the equalization that took place within gender groups dominated at the end.
A natural direction in which to move from here is to extend the analysis of
Directional mobility by controlling for more than one factor at a time. This is
done in the next chapter where the determinants of earnings mobility are analyzed.
Before that though, a closer look will be given to the relationship between initial
advantage and earnings mobility.
Chapter 4
Initial Earnings and the Determinants of
Earnings Mobility
4.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the impact of initial earnings on mobility, as well as the effect
of other socioeconomic variables on earnings changes. In particular, the questions
addressed are: “Are the most advantaged individuals gaining more (losing less) in
terms of earnings changes?”, “What is the ceteris paribus impact of socioeconomic
characteristics of the individual on earnings mobility?”, and finally “How do these
factors affect the impact of initial earnings on mobility?”.
The first question is concerned with whether the mobility process benefits(hurts)
the rich more(less) than the poor, or is it that this process benefits more the low-
earners, allowing them to catch-up as time goes by? This question is closely
related to the study of poverty traps and cumulative advantage. The main dif-
ference between those studies and this chapter is that they are usually concerned
with dynamic processes in the long-run, while this chapter, due to data limita-
tions, focuses on mobility in the short-run. Studying mobility in the short-term
allows identifying the differential impact of macroeconomic shocks on the mobility
of individuals at different points of the earnings distribution.
With respect to the second set of questions, i.e., the study of the determinants
of earnings dynamics, this chapter tries to specify which variables, in addition to
initial earnings, explain earnings mobility. In particular, it identifies the impact
of factors like gender, education, age, sector of employment (informal vs. formal),
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and geographical region on earnings changes.
Two methodological issues that are of particular concern in the mobility litera-
ture are the potential negative effects of measurement error in the earnings variable
and the attrition of individuals from the panel. Both topics are considered in this
chapter and the robustness of the results to these problems is explored.
Section 4.2 summarizes previous findings in the literature and presents the
contribution of this chapter. The methodology followed is explained in section 4.3,
and results are presented in section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Previous Research and Contribution
The literature on the relationship between mobility and initial earnings focuses
on two different questions. The first one is “What is the relationship between
earnings changes and initial earnings?”, and the second “What is the relation
between earnings changes and initial earnings, after one has controlled for the
effects of individual characteristics like age, education, gender, etc.?”.
These two questions are very different in nature. The unconditional question
deals with the common concern of whether “the richer are getting richer (and the
poor poorer)”, while the conditional one is concerned with the determinants of
mobility and the existence of state dependence in the conditional earnings dynam-
ics.1
For developed countries, the study of earnings dynamics has been pursued at
a great level of detail. In the US alone, earnings mobility studies have addressed
issues like the role of on-the-job-training on earnings (Hause, 1977), poverty dy-
1Later in this chapter it will be seen that this question implies studying whether
an individual converges to his own permanent level of earnings.
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namics (Lillard and Willis, 1978), wage dynamics and job turnover (Lillard, 1999),
and the covariance structure of earnings per se (Lillard and Weiss, 1979; MaCurdy,
1982; Abowd and Card, 1989). The high quality of the data in these countries
has allowed mobility researchers to even explore the dynamics of income variance
(Meghir and Pistaferri, 2001), and the effects of measurement error on the esti-
mated earnings mobility by means of validation data (Pischke, 1995).
For the case of developing countries the panorama is less positive. Most of
the panel data for these countries have few observations over time, and hence
many mobility studies are performed using two temporal observations per unit
of analysis (see for instance Grootaert et al., 1997; Fields et al., 2003a,b).2 In
addition, the lack of validation studies in these countries makes hard to assess the
extent of measurement error on the earnings variable, and its potential impact on
the estimated mobility parameters. Finally, another issue that makes the mobility
research harder to perform in these countries is the existence of high levels of
attrition in the surveys collected. In spite of these difficulties, research on earnings
mobility has continued to grow in the developing world.
For the Mexican economy two recent studies have appeared dealing with issues
very close in spirit to the present chapter. The papers by Antman and Mckenzie
(2005a) and Antman and Mckenzie (2005b) study earnings dynamics with the same
data over similar periods of time. Since the ENEU consists of 1-year panels, and
the authors are interested in studying mobility in the long-run, they create pseudo-
panels in which specific age-education cohort groups are tracked over long periods
of time. This method has advantages in extending the temporal coverage for
mobility studies over many years, and it potentially helps to mitigate the problems
2Needless to say, this clearly limits the type of dynamic structures that can be
estimated.
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of measurement error and attrition bias. However, this methodology makes strong
assumptions that are problematic in practice. First, by tracking the mobility of a
cohort they miss the study of any intra-cohort mobility that might take place over
time. Second, one cannot be sure that the mobility experienced by a cohort group
actually represents the true mobility experienced by a given group of individuals.
Issues like migration, deaths and household dissolution and creation might lead
to incorrect inferences when this method is applied. As rightly pointed out by
Deaton when discussing this methodology (otherwise strongly advocated by him)
“(...) time series of cross sections can tell us about average earnings for the cohort
over time, and it can tell us about inequality of earnings within the cohort and
how it is changing over time, but it cannot tell us how long individuals are poor,
or whether the people who are rich now were rich or poor at some earlier date”
(Deaton, 1997, p.120).
In Antman and Mckenzie (2005a) the authors focus on mobility in household
labor income. The authors are interested in studying whether there is uncondi-
tional convergence between the earnings of rich and poor households (what the
authors call absolute convergence), and whether there is conditional convergence
of the household’s earnings to its own average level. Since they work with cohort
average incomes, it is important to keep in mind that all the mobility results here
reviewed correspond to such averages. The authors find very little absolute con-
vergence between rich and poor households, i.e., in general households keep their
income levels over time. However, there is rapid conditional convergence, and it
increases as time goes by.
The authors also compare pseudo-panel quarterly mobility estimates to the
ones stemming from true panels (following individuals instead of cohorts) and they
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find that their pseudo-panel results are surprisingly similar to the ones obtained
through instrumental variable estimations (attempting to correct for measurement
error) in the true panel. These estimates show much slower convergence than the
ones obtained through Ordinary Least Squares.
According to the authors, analyzing mobility over cohort averages gives them
the advantage of solving the problems of measurement error and attrition bias
commonly encountered in this type of studies. Regarding the measurement error
problem, although it seems plausible that averaging the incomes of several house-
holds in a given cohort will tend to diminish the household idiosyncratic measure-
ment error, this may not solve the overall problem if the households in a given
cohort systematically misreport their earnings, e.g., if households with highly ed-
ucated middle-aged heads underreport their income. As a solution to the attrition
problem, the authors use the first interview for each household (when there is no
attrition) in the construction of their pseudo-panels. Their overall finding is that
there is no substantial difference in their convergence estimates for subsamples of
attritors and non-attritors.
In a companion paper (Antman and Mckenzie, 2005b) the authors use the
same pseudo-panels to study whether there are poverty traps in Mexico. More
specifically they study the possibility of nonlinearities in household labor-income
dynamics. Their finding is that there are no poverty traps for Mexican urban
households. One limitation of this study is that it bases its conclusions on the
analysis of quarterly dynamics of income. Hence, the authors try to capture poverty
traps under a very stringent definition of what these traps are.
Other studies analyzing the determinants of earnings mobility in Mexico are
Maloney and Cunningham (2000), Maloney et al. (2004), and World Bank (2004).
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The main aim of this literature is studying vulnerability in Mexico. In particular,
they ask which subgroups of the population are more “vulnerable” to income falls.
Their analysis focuses mainly on studying what happens at the bottom of he
conditional earnings mobility distribution, where the conditioning factors are a set
of socioeconomic variables. The authors of these studies consider that the group
at the bottom of the conditional earnings distribution suffers “disproportionate
‘catastrophic’ shocks” (i.e., they are more “vulnerable”) and these shocks would
not be captured by standard regression methods.
The periods covered by Maloney and Cunningham (2000) and Maloney et al.
(2004) include before, during and after the 1994 Peso crisis, as well as 2000-2002.
The data set used by these studies is again the ENEU. Among their main findings
are that, holding everything else constant, the least educated and poor suffered
slightly less in terms of earnings changes during the 1994 Peso crisis, but at the cost
of having to put other members of the household in the labor market. They also
find that if higher weights are attached to the income changes of poorer house-
holds, the households with a less educated head present large losses, something
interpreted by the authors as higher vulnerability. Finally, they find that the struc-
ture of the determinants of earnings changes is quite stable regardless of whether
the economy is in recession or not. The only main difference observed is that,
holding everything else constant, during recessions the more educated households
experience larger earnings losses.
It is important to stress that none of the conditional mobility estimations in
these papers included the initial income level as an explanatory variable. Never-
theless, some evidence is provided for the relationship between household income
change and a proxy for permanent income. The relationship they find between
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these two variables is negative and stronger during the 1994-95 recession (when
compared to the one of the recovery period that followed afterwards).
One interesting analysis conducted in World Bank (2004) is the inclusion of
rural households. This study incorporates results based on a recently created rural
panel survey that complements the ENEU to form the new National Survey of
Quarterly Employment (ENET). The period of analysis goes from 2000 to 2002.
The results obtained with the ENET are compared to the ones from another rural
panel generated to evaluate the PROGRESA poverty alleviation program. This
last panel covers the 1998-2000 period and, in contrast with the ENET, it contains
information on consumption of the households. While the authors obtain similar
results when comparing the urban and rural sub-samples of the ENET, they reach
very different conclusions when analyzing consumption changes in the PROGRESA
panel. In particular, they find considerable consumption smoothing on the part
of the households. More importantly, they find that less educated households and
household headed by older workers fare worse in terms of consumption changes.
Since these categories are proxies for a permanent disadvantage, it seems that more
disadvantaged households fared worse in terms of consumption mobility. These
results contradict the findings for the rural part of the ENET, and stress the
fact that income (and its change) cannot fully appraise the welfare of a group of
individuals. Another important conclusion coming out of this comparison is that
what happens in rural Mexico in terms of economic mobility, might be very different
from what happens in urban areas. In particular, there is a generalized perception
that the rural areas have fared worse in terms of mobility in Mexico. The findings
reported in World Bank (2004) provide evidence supporting this perception. Since
this chapter focuses on urban areas only, it is crucial to keep in mind that the
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findings here presented may not generalize to the whole country.
In the light of these previous studies, the contribution of the present chapter
to the previous mobility literature is to focus in the short-run earnings dynamics
experienced by individuals in urban Mexico, with an emphasis on the role played
by initial advantage on mobility. This chapter also provides further evidence on the
role played by socioeconomic factors determining mobility, and interprets the re-
sults within the framework of a structural model of earnings. The results obtained
are analyzed over a long period of time, with varying macroeconomic conditions.
Finally, the robustness of the findings to different measures of initial advantage,
to measurement error and to attrition bias are tested. Some results similar to the
ones here reported also appear in Fields et al. (2005).
4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 Unconditional Mobility
This section introduces the methodology used to analyze the relationship between
mobility and initial advantage. Denote by yit the earnings of individual i at period
t, and its change by ∆yit, then in order to answer the question: “Are the most
advantaged individuals gaining more (losing less) in terms of earnings changes?”,
one natural place to start is by estimating the expected earnings changes given
initial earnings, i.e., E(∆yit|yit−1). The simplest assumption to make about this
conditional expectation is that it is linear, i.e.,
∆yit = β0 + β1yit−1 + uit (4.1)
Then the answer to the previous question will depend on the sign of the β1
parameter. More specifically, there will be divergence in earnings if β1 > 0. On
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the other hand there will be convergence if β1 < 0, and the earnings changes
patterns will be parallel if β1 = 0. In other words, a positive β1 means that the
individuals at the top of the initial earnings distribution have more positive (or
less negative) earnings changes, i.e., the rich got richer. On the contrary, if β1 is
negative then there is convergence between the individuals at the bottom and the
ones at the top of such distribution, i.e., the least advantaged gain the most (lose
the less). Finally, if β1 equals zero then earnings mobility is not affected by initial
earnings, and mobility depends only on the constant β0 and the random factors
captured by uit. Since these random factors average to zero, a β1 = 0 means that
on average everybody experiences the same mobility β0.
The relationship stated in equation (4.1) can be estimated by Least Squares
(LS) for earnings both in levels and logarithms. The estimation in levels gives a
measure of the convergence in pesos, while the logarithmic specification estimates
the amount of log-convergence, which gives a larger weight to the mobility of poorer
individuals and approximates the proportional mobility by level of initial earnings.
Since there are many overlapping short-run panels over which to estimate this
relationship, there will be several LS estimates of the β1 parameter, one for each
period (i.e., there will be many β1t’s). With these many β1t’s it is possible to track
the evolution of convergence over time, and across varying macroeconomic condi-
tions. Since outliers might create a problem in certain years, a median regression
is also estimated and the results are compared to the ones of the LS analysis.3
The interpretation of the previous β1 parameters is an issue that deserves fur-
ther discussion. Even if it were observed that earnings converge (i.e., β1 < 0) it is
3As mentioned in the Chapter 2 all the parameters reported are weighted es-
timates using sampling weights, and the standard errors account for the survey
design in the ENEU.
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not evident what meaning should be attached to this finding. A negative β1 could
be the product of reversion to the mean resulting from adjustments in earnings to a
temporary shock. For instance, it is possible that individuals who reported having
low (high) earnings in the base period were temporarily unlucky (lucky) and that
the positive (negative) mobility observed for them is just an adjustment back to
their permanent earnings level.4 A negative β1 could also mean that individuals
at the bottom are truly faring better by experiencing gains that will continue in
the future.
As previously mentioned, issues of mobility in the long-run cannot be analyzed
with the data at hand. However, measures of permanent advantage can be gen-
erated and used to analyze their impact on mobility. In particular, a regression
similar to (4.1) can be estimated using a proxy of permanent advantage as the in-
dependent variable. In this chapter, this predicted permanent advantage measure
yˆit−1 is formed in two ways: first, by averaging the earnings of the individual using
all the quarters of information available (instead of using earnings from the first
interview only), and second, by regressing initial earnings on variables that would
be good predictors of the permanent advantage of an individual. These predictors
include human capital variables like age, education, gender, and wealth proxies like
cluster average earnings, and dwelling characteristics. The prediction exercises are
done by Least Squares and by median regression, one for each period, and new
βP1t’s are estimated using each one of these methods.
4Further empirical evidence of whether this is happening will be provided below.
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4.3.2 Conditional Mobility and the Socioeconomic Deter-
minants of Mobility
This section presents the methods used to analyze the second set of questions:
“What is the ceteris paribus impact of socioeconomic characteristics of the indi-
vidual on earnings mobility?” and “How do these factors affect the impact of
initial earnings on mobility?”.
Broadly speaking, the socioeconomic characteristics of an individual can be
grouped in time-invariant characteristics Zi and time-variant characteristics Xit−1
andXit. The time-invariant characteristics include gender, age (linear and squared),
education (linear and squared), and regional dichotomous variables. The time-
variant variables refer to sector of employment, meaning formal wage work, formal
self-employment, informal wage work, informal self-employment, and unemploy-
ment.
In order to be able to interpret the results of the conditional mobility estima-
tions within a structural framework, it is useful to start with specifying an earnings
equation and from there derive a mobility equation. A natural starting point is to
allow earnings at time t to be affected by all the factors listed under Zi and Xit.
That means that earnings are determined by age, gender, education level, region,
and sector of employment.
Whether this constitutes truly exogenous “determination” or not, is a matter of
debate. Variables like sector of employment and region are potentially endogenous
to the earnings determination process, since an individual could choose which
sector to work in, or which region to migrate to depending on his earnings mobility.
Keeping this caveat in mind, this section will proceed by treating these variables
as pre-determined, and will ignore the potential complications that arise due to
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these issues.5 Finally, since no attempt will be made to correct for the potential
self-selection of individuals into the labor force, all the results should be considered
to apply only for the subpopulation of individuals participating in the labor force
both in the initial and the final periods.
The basic specification of the earnings equation is6
yit = Ziγt +Xitκt + εit (4.2)
where the error term εit is independent of Zi and Xit and autocorrelated, i.e.,
εit = ρtεit−1 + ηit
ηit ⊥ Xit, Zi ηit ∼ (0, σ2η) ∀i, t
This equation states that earnings at time t depend on the time-invariant char-
acteristics Z, time-variant characteristics X at time t, and an error term ε that
captures shocks to earnings. The effects of past values of the time-variant charac-
teristics and of the shocks are assumed to enter only through the current values
of these factors. This equation provides a rationale for why initial earnings would
affect earnings changes, even after conditioning for socioeconomic characteristics.
In particular, the AR(1) structure assumed for the ε term ensures that yit−1 has an
impact on earnings mobility. To see why note that the earnings changes implied
by (4.2) are
∆yit = Zi(∆γt) + (∆Xit)κt +Xit−1(∆κt) + ((ρt − 1)εit−1 + ηit)
hence substituting εit−1 = yit−1 − Ziγt−1 −Xit−1κt−1 into this expression leads to
∆yit = (ρt − 1)yit−1 + Ziγ˜t + (∆Xit)κt +Xit−1κ˜t + ηit (4.3)
5Chapter 5 in this dissertation studies more closely the issue of sector selec-
tion, in particular whether individuals are free to choose among sectors and the
implications for earnings mobility.
6A similar model was used in Fields et al. (2003a)
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where γ˜t = γt − ρtγt−1 and κ˜t = κt − ρtκt−1. Therefore, under this model, the
effect of initial earnings yit−1 on earnings mobility after conditioning a on a set
of socioeconomic variables comes from the autocorrelation of the unobserved error
component.7
In the present application of the model described by eq. (4.3), the only
time-varying variables will be dichotomous variables indicating the sector of em-
ployment, as a result, a slightly modified version of this equation is estimated.
In particular, denote by st(l,m) a dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if
the individual transited from sector l to sector m, and zero otherwise, and let
pilm = κt(m)− ρtκt−1(l), where κt(j) is the j-th element of the vector κt, i.e., is the





m st(l,m)pilm, hence the conditional mobility
equation (4.3) can be rewritten as





st(l,m)pilm + ηit. (4.4)
This is the equation that will be estimated.
This model subsumes the partial adjustment model as a particular case. If the
steady state earnings of an individual are defined as
ysi = Ziγ +Xiκ
and if Xit = Xi, κt = κ, γt = γ, ρt = ρ, then equation (4.4) can be rewritten as
∆yit = (1− ρ)(ysi − yit−1) + ηit
7A richer version of the model expressed by (4.2) and (4.3) would allow for
the presence of individual unobserved time-invariant effects, δi. Since the present
dissertation focuses on yearly mobility, of which only one observation per individual
is available, it will not be possible to separately identify the aforementioned effects.
For this reason, this more complicated structure is not pursued here. Nevertheless,
the reader should keep in mind this limitation when interpreting the parameters
of variables under X and Z estimated from eq. (4.4).
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where the parameter ρ is adjustment coefficient of earnings to its steady state. In
particular, if the variables grouped under X and Z constitute the determinants
of permanent earnings, the influence of yit−1 on earnings mobility comes from the
adjustment of earnings to its permanent level.
The issue of which variables constitute determinants of permanent earnings
deserves careful consideration. While it is less controversial that time-invariant
variables like age, education and gender are determinants of long-term advantage
(and hence of permanent earnings), characteristics like sector of employment and
region do not necessarily determine permanent earnings. Whether they do or
not depends on how easy it is for individuals to move geographically and across
sectors.8
Equation (4.4) is estimated by (robust) LS and median regression for changes
in earnings and log-earnings under several specifications. The specifications in-
clude: (1) Human Capital variables (age and education), plus gender and regional
dummies as the only regressors, (2) the previous variables plus sector transitions
dummies, and (3) the variables in specification (2) allowing ρt to vary for differ-
ent groups of the population. The groups considered are gender, age, education,
initial sector of employment and region. Specification (3) tests whether there are
different rates of convergence for each of these groups.
Since the methods presented in this section involve the comparison of large
amounts of results, the presentation of such results will be done by graphing the
coefficient of yit−1, i.e., (ρt − 1) for the various specifications, and the full set
of regression results will be presented only for the data grouped under 3 pooled
periods. The pooled periods are Q1:87-Q2:93, Q3:94-Q1:99, and Q2:99-Q4:02.
8The issue of geographic mobility is not dealt with here, since the data does
not allow tracking individuals that migrate.
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4.3.3 Robustness checks
Two issues that concern many researchers studying mobility are the presence of
measurement error in the earnings variable and attrition bias. Errors or misre-
ports of earnings can lead to serious biases in the estimation of the coefficients in
equations (4.1) and (4.4). It could even be the case that initial earnings have no
effect on mobility, and still a relationship is found due to the correlations of the
measurement error terms. On the other hand, the existence of attrition (and non-
reporting) leads to problems in identifying the conditional expectations of interest,
since the dependent variable will not be observed for a fraction of the population.
If both problems present themselves together then there could be a serious threat
to the quality of the estimates. This section presents methods to assess the possible
impacts of these two problems, one at a time.
4.3.4 Measurement Error
Until recently, it was usually assumed that measurement error of economic variables
was always of the classical variety, i.e., the measurement error was assumed to be
an iid term, uncorrelated with the true value of the variable of interest, with any
other variable in the model, with the error term in the equation of interest, and
with any other measurement error in any other variable. Although this model is
analytically convenient, enough evidence has accumulated over the past decade
showing that this assumption does not hold in general for the earnings variable
used in labor studies (see Bound and Krueger, 1991; Bound et al., 1994; Pischke,
1995; Bound et al., 2001). Individuals tend to report what they “usually” earn,
and not necessarily the exact earnings they had in a specific period. Also, reach
individuals might underreport their earnings out of fear that the survey will be used
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for tax purposes.9 Similarly, individuals at the bottom of the earnings distribution
might overstate their incomes out of embarrassment. Unfortunately, for the case
of Mexico there are no validation studies that allow testing the nature of this
potential problem.
Given this data limitation, the approach taken here is to follow the measure-
ment error model proposed in Bound et al. (1994) and extended by Pischke (1995),
in order to show some implications of this model for the mobility estimations per-
formed in this chapter.10 The main caveat of proceeding this way is that the
measurement error evidence on which this section relies, comes from a validation
study performed on a single Detroit firm in the mid-eighties.11 The earnings mea-
sure in that study is annual earnings coming both from employer records and the
answers to a PSID questionnaire applied to a sample of workers in that firm.
Clearly, using a validation study for a single US firm is far from satisfactory
(although a similar model applies to the more representative CPS survey when
compared to Social Security records). Also, in the case of Mexico the ENEU
reports monthly earnings, instead of yearly earnings. This earnings variable is
constructed by allowing the respondent to choose a preferred time framework (day,
week, month, etc.) and to report their earnings during that period. After that,
the interviewer performs whatever conversion is necessary to transform that report
into monthly earnings. Although this scheme reduces the error due to bad recall
of true earnings, it makes the PSID model less applicable to the Mexican case.
9In the case of Mexico, it seems more plausible that such individuals would
underreport their earnings out of fear of being kidnaped.
10A similar route was adopted before by Fields et al. (2003a) following a variant
of the model proposed by Bound et al. (1994).
11The validation study is the PSID Validation Study, for a description see Dun-
can and Hill (1985) and Duncan and Mathiowetz (1985).
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The measurement error model proposed in Bound et al. (1994) is one where
the measurement error has mean zero and is “mean reverting”, i.e., it is negatively
correlated with the true value of earnings. Later on, Pischke (1995) studied more
carefully the same validation survey and the relationship between measurement
error and earnings dynamics. He proposed a slightly different version of the Bound
et al. (1994) measurement error model, in which the mean reverting measurement
error term applied only to the transitory component of earnings, i.e., when asked
about their earnings for the preceding year individuals tended to report their usual
earnings.
Based on the previous insights, the following measurement error model is used
in this dissertation. Let yit be measured earnings, y
∗
it be the true value of current
earnings and µit be the measurement error. Then
yit = y
∗
it + µit. (4.5)
True earnings are assumed to be the sum of two orthogonal components, per-
manent earnings, yPit , and transitory earnings, which in order to follow the notation




it + εit y
P
it ⊥ εit (4.6)
Furthermore, the measurement error is assumed to be linearly related to true
earnings according to the following equation13
µit = α(y
∗
it − yPit ) + ζit α < 0 (4.7)
12Note that the term denoting permanent earnings yPit is not necessarily constant
over time, making it consistent with the interpretation given under eqn. (4.2).
13Both in Bound et al. (1994) and Pischke (1995) the measurement error model
is derived for log-earnings rather than earnings in levels; however, Pischke (1995)
notes that the same structure also applies to the earnings variable in levels.
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where the term ζit is the idiosyncratic component of measurement error which has
mean zero, finite variance σ2ζ , and it is uncorrelated with true earnings, but it can
be autocorrelated. In particular, ζit is assumed to follow an AR(1) process, i.e.,
ζit = θζit−1 + ωit ωit ∼ iid(0, σ2ω) (4.8)
If the measurement error follows the previous structure, then it can be shown




+ (ρ− 1)α(2 + α)V (εit−1)
V (yit−1)
+ (θ − 1)V (ζit−1)
V (yit−1)
(4.9)
as shown in the appendix of this chapter.14
Expression (4.9) can be used to make simple simulations by assuming possible
values for ρ, θ and α. The simulations performed will aim at estimating what
size of measurement error would lead to the erroneous conclusion that there is
convergence in earnings, when in fact the true β1 is zero.
Another result that follows from this assumed structure of measurement error,
is that the estimated coefficient when regressing ∆yit on predicted permanent initial
advantage yˆit−1 will not be biased. A formal derivation is also included in the
appendix.15
Finally, turning to the implications of measurement error on the conditional







14Similar results with related measurement error models have been derived in
Fields et al. (2003a) and Antman and Mckenzie (2005a).
15It can be proved that this estimation will not be biased even under a more
general measurement error structure in which the measurement error is correlated
with both the transitory and the permanent components of earnings.
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It is clear from this expression that the variable yit−1 is not independent from
the error term, because of its correlation with ζit−1. This correlation will bias all
the parameter estimates in the model, when estimated by OLS. The only exception
to this would occur if θ = ρ, i.e., if the correlation in transitory earnings equals
the correlation in the idiosyncratic measurement error, something which seems
extremely unlikely in practice.
The route taken when estimating eqn. (4.10) will be to use occupational dum-
mies together with wealth proxies as instruments for yit−1 (in addition to all the
variables included under Z and X). This method is not fully satisfactory, since
in such IV estimation there will be a component of transitory mobility that will
not be captured by the instruments, leading to underestimation of the conditional
mobility in the model.
4.3.5 Attrition Bias
Concerning attrition and non-reporting of the earnings variable in the panel, the
approach taken here is to abandon the pretension of obtaining precise point esti-
mates of E(∆yit|yit−1), and instead turn to partial identification techniques (see
for instance Manski, 1995, 2003). The idea underlying partial identification analy-
sis is to provide a whole region where the conditional expectation of interest can
lie, given that the information available is not complete. The advantage of this
approach is that the set of assumptions made in generating the identification re-
gions are minimal. In this chapter partial identification analysis will be applied
to the case of missing outcomes (earnings in the final period) due to attrition and
non-reporting. These are the two biggest sources for missing data in the sample.
In order to see how these methods work in the present context, let zi be an
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indicator variable on whether the earnings of individual i are observed in the final
period. Also for simplicity of exposition, rescale E(∆yit|yit−1) to make it lie inside
the [0,1] interval. By the law of iterated expectations
E(∆yit|yit−1) = E(∆yit|yit−1, zi = 1) · P (zi = 1|yit−1)
+ E(∆yit|yit−1, zi = 0) · P (zi = 0|yit−1).
The data alone reveals E(∆yit|yit−1, zi = 1), P (zi = 1|yit−1) and P (zi = 0|yit−1)
only. Since the whole expectation was rescaled to lie between [0,1], it follows that
the lowest value E(∆yit|yit−1) can take is
E(∆yit|yit−1, zi = 1) · P (zi = 1|yit−1)
when E(∆yit|yit−1, zi = 0) = 0, and the highest value it can take is
E(∆yit|yit−1, zi = 1) · P (zi = 1|yit−1) + P (zi = 0|yit−1)
when E(∆yit|yit−1, zi = 0) = 1. Any point between these two bounds forms the
identification region H[E(∆yit|yit−1)]. Any values inside this region are logically
possible for E(∆yit|yit−1), given the amount of attrition and non-response in the
data. This identification region is estimated by nonparametric methods.
It is important to remark that without any extra assumptions, the informa-
tion contained in H[E(∆yit|yit−1)] is all that the data reveals about E(∆yit|yit−1).
Hence, the estimation of this region without further assumptions gives the worst
case scenario for the impact of the loss of information due to attrition and non-
reporting. Plausible extra assumptions can narrow the width of the identification
region H[E(∆yit|yit−1)]. However, that refinement will be left for further exten-




This section presents the results that pertain to the unconditional mobility analy-
sis as described in section 4.3.1. In particular, it presents the estimates for the
parameter β1 from equation (4.1), i.e.,
∆yit = β0 + β1yit−1 + uit.
Figure 4.1 plots β1 obtained by Least Squares, both for earnings in levels and
logarithms. The graphs show unanimously that there is convergence between the
earnings of rich and poor. That is, over a calendar year the initially poor got
richer, and the initially rich got poorer.16 The graphs of the parameters do not
show a specific trend or pattern of this convergence over time.17
Since the LS estimates can be strongly affected by the presence of outliers, a
more robust specification is presented in Figure 4.2 which plots the estimates of β1,
now computed by a median regression. These estimates confirm the convergence
result obtained through LS. In the case of the regression with earnings in levels
the estimates present an inverted U-pattern in the second half of the sample. The
estimates for log-earnings are quite similar to the LS ones, presumably because the
logarithmic transformation diminishes the effects of outliers in the LS regression.
Although the finding of convergence in earnings between rich and poor over
a calendar year seems clear (leaving aside issues of measurement error), it is not
16It is important to remark that this convergence in earnings is not just the
result of the inclusion of unemployed individuals in the sample. The fraction of
unemployed individuals in the sample is too small to drive this result, and estima-
tions of β1 excluding the unemployed give undistinguishable parameter estimates,
as Figure 4.18 in the Appendix demonstrates.
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Figure 4.2: Unconditional Mobility Parameter. Median Regression
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evident how to interpret this result. On one side it could mean that low-earners are
catching up with high-earners; but, as previously mentioned, this could also be the
product of an adjustment to a temporary shock in earnings, without any true ap-
proaching between rich and poor. Evidence supporting this second interpretation
is presented in Figure 4.3.
The graphs in Figure 4.3 plot the average earnings profiles for individuals clas-
sified at different points in time into quintiles of the earnings distribution. They
show that in the quarter in which the quintile classification takes place, the earn-
ings of the individuals in the lowest quintile are considerably lower than at any
other period. Similarly, in this period the average earnings of the individuals in
the top quintile appear to be considerably larger than what they usually are. In
other words, classifying individuals as rich and poor based on the earnings of a
single period exacerbates their apparent advantage or deprivation (depending on
the case). The implication of this finding for the present unconditional mobility
estimations is that when regressing ∆yit on initial earnings, part of the convergence
obtained reflects the adjustment of earnings back to their “regular” level, and not
necessarily convergence between these earnings profiles.18
In order to capture the relationship between mobility and “permanent” ad-
vantage, regressions like (4.1) are estimated now using measures of permanent
advantage as a regressor. In particular, two measures of permanent advantage
are considered. The first one is average earnings over time, for each individual.
The second one is constructed by regressing initial earnings on a set of variables
that are related to permanent advantage like age, education, gender, and wealth
proxies, and uses the parameter estimates of this regression to predict yˆit−1. The
18Although this graph corresponds to one of the last panels in the sample, similar
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OLS Unconditional Beta parameter
Average Earnings First 4 Periods
Figure 4.4: Unconditional Mobility Parameter with Average Earnings as Measure of
Permanent Advantage
results of these estimations are plotted in Figures 4.4 to 4.6.19
Figure 4.4 contains the graphs where average earnings is a measure of per-
manent advantage. Here two exercises are performed, one averaging earnings in
the first 4 quarters and the second averaging earnings over the full 5 quarters of
observations. Both estimations are performed only for earnings in levels. Fig-
ure 4.5 contains the estimates when the measure of permanent advantage is the
predicted earnings stemming from a regression of initial earnings on human cap-
ital variables and wealth proxies. These predictions are made both for earnings
in levels and log-earnings. Finally, Figure 4.6 plots the results corresponding to
a predicted yˆit−1 coming from a regression that, in addition to all the regressors
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Figure 4.5: Unconditional Mobility Parameter with Predicted Earnings as a Measure of
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Figure 4.6: Unconditional Mobility Parameter with Predicted Earnings as Measure of
Permanent Advantage. Human Capital, Wealth Proxies and Sector Controls.
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previously mentioned, also includes sectoral dummies indicating whether the in-
dividual is a formal wage worker, informal wage worker, formal self-employed or
informal self-employed.
All these figures show that yearly mobility is unrelated to the generated mea-
sures of permanent advantage for most of the years in the sample. The only major
exception occurs right after the 1994 Peso crisis in the regressions with earnings
in levels when there is convergence in earnings. Besides this episode, only a cou-
ple of divergent results in the early nineties, and a slightly convergent pattern
during 1998 and 2001 are observed. One interesting point is that the lack of log-
convergence after the Peso crisis implies that in this episode the “permanent” rich
lost more than the “permanent” poor, but their losses were proportional to their
higher levels of earnings.
In order to have a better idea of the first-stage predictions in the previous exer-
cises, Table 4.1 reproduces one of these first-stage regressions (for the 1st-quarter of
1987) for the variable of earnings in levels. This regression shows that earnings are
positively related to age, education (with an increasing convex pattern), being male
and to cluster average earnings (a wealth proxy). Being a formal self-employed has
the largest returns followed by informal self-employment, formal wage work and
informal wage work.
The R2-Adjusted for all the regressions over time, both in levels and logarithms,
are presented in Figure 4.7. This figure shows that the R2 of these first-stage regres-
sions fluctuates between 25% and 45%, with the logarithmic regressions having a
better fit. These magnitudes are in line with similar earnings equations estimated
for other countries. If the assumed model of earnings is right, then at a given
point in time, approximately 30% of the variation in earnings is due to differences
92














Cluster Average Earnings 0.745 ***
(0.11)
Sector of Employment
Informal Worker 3699.613 ***
(441.63)
Informal Self-employed 4416.127 ***
(331.24)
Formal Self-employed 7546.767 ***
(1399.52)





























R2−Adj IV First Stage
Figure 4.7: R2 Adjusted of First Stage of IV Model. Human Capital, Wealth Proxies,
and Sector Controls.
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in permanent earnings. Again, the caveat raised in footnote 7 about the effects of
unobserved characteristics applies here.
Summarizing, these findings confirm that the strong convergence obtained when
using reported earnings as a measure of initial advantage was mostly due to a
short-run adjustment of earnings back to their permanent level. In other words,
the mobility over a year did not alter the permanent advantage of the individuals
in the economy. The only exception to this occurred in the aftermath of the 1994
Peso crisis. This crisis brought proportional losses to everybody in the economy,
making the richer individuals lose more than anybody else in absolute terms.
4.4.2 Conditional Mobility and the Determinants of Earn-
ings Changes
To start the presentation of the results on conditional mobility the parameter ρt−1
from eq. (4.4), i.e.,






is plotted for several specifications.
Figure 4.8 shows this parameter when the included controls are only time-
invariant variables Zi that capture human capital characteristics like age, educa-
tion and gender, plus regional control dummies. As it can be appreciated, there
is always convergence to the conditional mean, and this convergence is slightly
stronger than the unconditional convergence presented in the previous section.
This means that the overall effect of the human capital and regional controls is
to generate divergence in earnings, so that once these socioeconomic variables are

































Employed and unemployed individuals





























































Employed and unemployed individuals
































Median Conditional Earnings Parameter
Logarithms
Figure 4.8: Conditional Mobility Parameter. Human Capital and Regional Controls.
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seen that this parameter, which is around -0.6 would imply a value for ρ of about
0.4, i.e., the auto-regression parameter in transitory earnings is about 0.4.
These estimates are complemented by estimating the same conditional conver-
gence parameter now including sector transition dummies as additional controls.
As it can be seen from Figure 4.9 the conditional mobility parameters are very
similar to the ones of Figure 4.8, hence, sector transition controls do not seem to
affect much the conditional convergence rates.
Before moving to analyze the specific effect of the Zi, Xit variables on earnings
mobility, the results from estimating different ρt−1 by subgroups of the population
are presented. The reason for doing this extension is that the rate at which earnings
converge to the conditional mean might differ for different groups of the population.
These estimations include interactions by age, education, gender, sector, and region















where g denotes group, and 1(i ∈ g) is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if
the individual i belongs to group g, and zero otherwise. Notice that because γ˜t and
pilm are both functions of ρt, the model that allows ρt to vary by groups implies a
fully interactive conditional mobility equation.
Figures 4.10-4.14 contain the estimates of these interactions. Out of all the
interactions estimated, the groups that seem to have some noticeable differences
in their convergence rates are the education and sector groups. In the case of
education groups, the higher the education the smaller the convergence rates. This
means that shocks are more persistent for more educated individuals. In the case of
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Figure 4.9: Conditional Mobility Parameter. Human Capital, Regional and Sector Tran-
sition Controls.
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sector groups, the formal wage workers present the lowest convergence rates, while
the formal self-employed exhibit the highest ones, although their convergence rates
also fluctuate more.
The only other noticeable differences in these graphs is that during the second
half of the sample women tend to have lower convergence rates than men, but this
result is only valid in the logarithmic specification, and is statistically significant
only for a couple of years. In the case of regional interactions, the differences in
ρt−1 are statistically significant in about half of the cases, but it is not clear what
pattern emerges.
In order to present the direct effects of socioeconomic variables on earnings
changes, the data is first pooled for all the years in the sample. The results from
these regressions are shown in Table 4.2.
The results for the regression in levels show that age increases mobility, but
at a decreasing rate. Education on the contrary has a convex pattern. From 0 to
about 3 years of education an extra year of education reduces earnings mobility,
but after that point it increases it.21 Being a male has a large positive impact on
mobility.
Out of all the sector transitions, the one into formal self-employment is always
associated with the largest gains, after controlling for everything else. This could
be generated by the potential inclusion of capital gains in the earnings reported
by the self-employed. Aside from movements into unemployment (which trivially
involve losses), the most negative conditional mobility is associated with transitions
into informal wage work. The other destination sectors (Formal wage work and
informal self-employment) are between the two previous extremes, and they have
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Equality Hypothesis Test by Age Group
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Equality Hypothesis Test by Education Group


















































F−statistic F dist 95%














































F−statistic F dist 95%
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Equality Hypothesis Test by Sector
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Equality Hypothesis Test by Region
Figure 4.14: Conditional Mobility Parameter by Region.
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roughly equal mobility.22
Finally, in what concerns the regional analysis the cities along the US Border
and in the North experience higher conditional mobility, while the Center and the
South exhibit less positive conditional mobility. The omitted region is Mexico City.
The results for the regression in logarithms show a similar pattern to the one above
described.
The set of estimations of eq. (4.4) broken down by pooled subperiods are shown
in Tables 4.3 and 4.4.
In these tables, the effect of age is similar to the one obtained in the pooled
regressions; however, the positive effect of age has diminished over time. Again, the
convex pattern is found for the years of education variable. However, as time goes
by the inflection point at which the positive effect on mobility kicks in is located
at higher levels of education, i.e., the negative effect of education on mobility for
individuals with low education has become more pervasive.23
The positive effects of being male on mobility are large in all periods, and under
all the specifications. However, while in the specification in levels the effect appears
to follow the cycle of average earnings (highest in the 87-93 period, lowest in the
95-99, otherwise in the middle); in the specification in logarithms this positive
effect has become stronger over the years.
22It is interesting to recall that a similar ranking of mobility by sector of desti-
nation was obtained in the previous chapter, where Directional mobility by sector
transition was studied.
23A similar conclusion applies to the regression in logarithms, while in the first
period going from 1987 to 1993 education had an increasing convex effect on log-
mobility, after 1999 a negative effect for low educated people appeared.
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Table 4.2: Pooled OLS Regression.
Dep. Var.: Change in Reported Earnings
Earnings Change Log-Earnings Change
Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.)
Initial Earnings -0.593 ***
(0.02)
Initial Log-Earnings -0.501 ***
(0.00)
Age
Linear 120.838 *** 0.020 ***
(16.95) (0.00)
Squared -1.263 *** -0.000 ***
(0.21) (0.00)
Education
Linear -142.341 *** -0.001
(13.35) (0.00)
Squared 19.311 *** 0.002 ***
(0.90) (0.00)
Male 802.052 *** 0.148 ***
(32.75) (0.00)
Sector Transitions
Unemployed to Informal Worker 3030.169 ***
(131.97)
Unemployed to Informal Self-employed 3979.493 ***
(224.04)
Unemployed to Formal Self-employed 19346.141 ***
(3964.50)
Unemployed to Formal Worker 4062.554 ***
(145.94)
Informal Worker to Unemployed -166.703
(146.01)
Informal Worker to Informal Worker 2480.740 ***
(116.57)
Informal Worker to Informal Self-employed 3212.336 *** 0.188 ***
(130.29) (0.02)
Informal Worker to Formal Self-employed 7293.322 *** 0.900 ***
(912.41) (0.14)
Informal Worker to Formal Worker 2850.443 *** 0.166 ***
(122.14) (0.01)
Informal Self-employed to Unemployed -1204.665 ***
(192.02)
Informal Self-employed to Informal Worker 2006.394 *** -0.104 ***
(124.17) (0.02)
Informal Self-employed to Informal Self-employed 3124.402 *** 0.119 ***
(133.73) (0.01)
Informal Self-employed to Formal Self-employed 8498.560 *** 0.640 ***
(766.89) (0.05)
Informal Self-employed to Formal Worker 2602.279 *** 0.139 ***
(145.01) (0.02)
Formal Self-employed to Unemployed -5689.423 ***
(767.25)
Formal Self-employed to Informal Worker 1591.859 * -0.144
(906.45) (0.14)
Formal Self-employed to Informal Self-employed 4582.217 *** 0.266 ***
(561.97) (0.04)
Formal Self-employed to Formal Self-employed 11571.363 *** 0.690 ***
(917.95) (0.04)
Formal Self-employed to Formal Worker 4884.640 *** 0.271 ***
(740.12) (0.05)
Formal Worker to Unemployed -1911.110 ***
(176.64)




Formal Worker to Informal Self-employed 3461.882 *** 0.160 ***
(160.32) (0.02)
Formal Worker to Formal Self-employed 8579.295 *** 0.630 ***
(824.12) (0.05)




US Border 562.339 *** 0.129 ***
(53.01) (0.01)
North 112.688 ** 0.024 ***
(45.09) (0.01)
Center -111.184 *** 0.003
(35.20) (0.01)
South -461.877 *** -0.085 ***
(51.45) (0.01)




* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The effects of sector transitions on mobility are similar to the ones described for
the pooled case. Transitions into informal wage work are associated with the most
negative mobility, while transitions into formal self-employment are associated with
the largest positive gains. In general, the transitions into informal self-employment
bring more upward conditional mobility than the ones into formal wage work, but
this effect is sometimes reversed during the aftermath of the 1994 Peso crisis.
It is important to stress here that these parameter estimates of sector transitions
should not to be taken as evidence of segmentation between formal and informal
sectors in Mexico. These parameters just reflect the conditional earnings changes
experienced by movers and stayers, and they need not reflect the counterfactual
gains a randomly selected individual would experience by moving from sector x
into sector y.
Regarding the regional patterns the effects are similar to the ones described in
the pooled case. It is worth mentioning that the positive effect on mobility of living
in a US Border city has become stronger over time. Whether this is related to the
increasing activity of “maquiladoras” (American assembly factories that benefit
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from the comparatively cheap labor across the border) is something that requires
further study.
So far the results presented have assumed that the earnings variables are mea-
sured without error, or more precisely that they are correctly reported. It also
assumed that the individuals that disappear from the sample or that do not re-
port their earnings are doing so at random. Both assumptions are unrealistic and
require further scrutiny. These issues are tackled in the next sections.
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Table 4.3: OLS Regression by Periods. Levels. Dep. Var.: Change in Reported Earnings
Q1:87-Q2:94 Q3:94-Q1:99 Q2:99-Q4:02
Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.)
Initial Earnings -0.621 *** -0.571 *** -0.587 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Age
Linear 194.290 *** 92.974 *** 66.527 **
(29.20) (25.14) (32.39)
Squared -2.099 *** -0.928 *** -0.613
(0.36) (0.32) (0.41)
Education
Linear -91.764 *** -148.619 *** -181.971 ***
(21.02) (22.76) (28.00)
Squared 19.135 *** 18.146 *** 21.001 ***
(1.38) (1.52) (1.87)
Male 968.224 *** 597.598 *** 780.774 ***
(54.73) (43.76) (71.22)
Sector Transitions
Unemployed to Informal Worker 4111.114 *** 2499.281 *** 3030.385 ***
(272.40) (143.01) (280.08)
Unemployed to Informal Self-employed 5060.229 *** 3045.929 *** 5299.060 ***
(393.15) (240.27) (767.00)
Unemployed to Formal Self-employed 14615.738 * 22656.096 *** 7423.921 ***
(7786.13) (3891.63) (394.66)
Unemployed to Formal Worker 4237.511 *** 3695.184 *** 4785.051 ***
(268.05) (207.29) (364.79)
Informal Worker to Unemployed -8.605 -379.147 * 265.666
(288.87) (203.14) (282.29)
Informal Worker to Informal Worker 3104.463 *** 1957.628 *** 2824.087 ***
(257.70) (143.53) (265.59)
Informal Worker to Informal Self-employed 4017.568 *** 2533.454 *** 3384.354 ***
(281.09) (164.19) (277.84)
Informal Worker to Formal Self-employed 7408.207 *** 7122.204 *** 8136.863 ***
(1112.99) (2171.75) (2585.46)
Informal Worker to Formal Worker 3484.269 *** 2199.401 *** 3143.540 ***
(262.05) (146.14) (275.63)
Informal Self-employed to Unemployed -1213.697 *** -1206.367 *** -939.647 **
(369.46) (260.78) (424.68)
Informal Self-employed to Informal Worker 2607.156 *** 1474.242 *** 2260.800 ***
(257.33) (165.95) (292.77)
Informal Self-employed to Informal Self-employed 3905.512 *** 2368.119 *** 3319.076 ***
(272.77) (175.49) (297.95)
Informal Self-employed to Formal Self-employed 9982.576 *** 6168.406 *** 8933.459 ***
(1436.25) (1189.88) (1020.36)
Informal Self-employed to Formal Worker 2969.937 *** 1977.717 *** 3138.862 ***
(289.38) (195.10) (316.64)
Formal Self-employed to Unemployed -7776.634 *** -4720.922 *** -3698.514 ***
(855.26) (736.62) (507.12)
Formal Self-employed to Informal Worker 2590.661 * 448.713 807.239
(1404.30) (675.60) (1852.53)
Formal Self-employed to Informal Self-employed 5802.505 *** 2658.578 *** 4711.537 ***
(848.51) (660.96) (1575.82)
Formal Self-employed to Formal Self-employed 12097.630 *** 10537.072 *** 12434.895 ***
(1192.00) (1703.91) (2141.84)
Formal Self-employed to Formal Worker 5827.793 *** 5278.981 *** 2437.215 **
(1076.09) (1523.93) (1051.56)
Formal Worker to Unemployed -1576.436 *** -1940.113 *** -2161.025 ***
(328.03) (237.81) (427.38)
Formal Worker to Informal Worker 3037.783 *** 1848.114 *** 2779.085 ***
(257.88) (152.20) (275.47)




Formal Worker to Formal Self-employed 8718.413 *** 7992.312 *** 9208.727 ***
(1282.34) (1268.39) (1670.31)




US Border 548.806 *** 608.806 *** 727.502 ***
(84.88) (79.31) (117.82)
North 85.365 109.581 276.262 ***
(76.47) (67.14) (91.18)
Center -79.721 -191.689 *** -18.502
(57.41) (48.92) (73.89)
South -464.985 *** -361.778 *** -467.909 ***
(85.22) (67.79) (109.58)
Constant -6545.706 *** -3419.910 *** -3433.571 ***
(645.21) (516.08) (687.17)
R-squared 0.333 0.376 0.331
N 98327 83112 55415
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.4: OLS Regression by Periods. Logarithms.
Dep. Var.: Change in Reported Earnings
Q1:87-Q2:94 Q3:94-Q1:99 Q2:99-Q4:02
Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.)
Initial Log-earnings -0.532 *** -0.510 *** -0.512 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age
Linear 0.025 *** 0.023 *** 0.015 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Squared -0.000 *** -0.000 *** -0.000 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Education
Linear 0.007 *** 0.003 -0.009 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Squared 0.001 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Male 0.148 *** 0.152 *** 0.156 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Sector Transitions
Informal Worker to Informal Self-employed 0.205 *** 0.173 *** 0.148 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Informal Worker to Formal Self-employed 0.818 *** 0.985 *** 0.847 ***
(0.20) (0.22) (0.13)
Informal Worker to Formal Worker 0.140 *** 0.163 *** 0.155 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Informal Self-employed to Informal Worker -0.064 ** -0.125 *** -0.148 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Informal Self-employed to Informal Self-employed 0.130 *** 0.105 *** 0.075 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Informal Self-employed to Formal Self-employed 0.583 *** 0.667 *** 0.628 ***
(0.06) (0.15) (0.06)
Informal Self-employed to Formal Worker 0.090 *** 0.145 *** 0.133 ***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Formal Self-employed to Informal Worker -0.010 -0.222 -0.617
(0.13) (0.17) (0.44)
Formal Self-employed to Informal Self-employed 0.259 *** 0.231 *** 0.222 **
(0.05) (0.05) (0.10)
Formal Self-employed to Formal Self-employed 0.665 *** 0.739 *** 0.631 ***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08)
Formal Self-employed to Formal Worker 0.281 *** 0.342 *** 0.054
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
Formal Worker to Informal Worker -0.001 -0.016 -0.015
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Formal Worker to Informal Self-employed 0.192 *** 0.065 ** 0.140 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Formal Worker to Formal Self-employed 0.532 *** 0.674 *** 0.649 ***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.12)




US Border 0.119 *** 0.167 *** 0.146 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
North 0.018 ** 0.020 ** 0.064 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Center 0.014 * -0.018 ** 0.016 *
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
South -0.060 *** -0.084 *** -0.104 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 3.397 *** 3.068 *** 3.470 ***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.09)
R-squared 0.269 0.286 0.279
N 95607 79650 53854
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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4.4.3 Measurement Error
As previously mentioned in the methodological section, a simulation is performed
in order to appraise the potential effects of measurement error on the unconditional
mobility estimates.




+ (ρ− 1)α(2 + α)V (εit−1)
V (yit−1)
+ (θ − 1)V (ζit−1)
V (yit−1)
consists in assuming that the true β1 = 0, i.e., the mobility profiles are unrelated
to initial earnings, and it is asked “How big should the measurement error be in
order to lead to the conclusion of convergence, when in fact there is none?”. More
specifically, the simulation tries to capture how big should the variance for the
measurement error component be as a fraction of the total variance of reported
earnings, in order to obtain convergence of the magnitudes observed.
Under the assumption of no convergence in true earnings, i.e if β1 = 0, there are
4 unknowns in equation (4.9): the α parameter that arises because of the correla-
tion between measurement error and true earnings, the autocorrelation parameter
ρ in transitory earnings, the variance of this term V (εit−1), and the autocorrelation
parameter θ in the idiosyncratic component of measurement error.24 Since these
are too many parameters to identify, the simulation here presented will further
assume θ = 0 and equal variances between transitory earnings and the idiosyn-
cratic component of measurement error, i.e., V (εit−1) = V (ζit−1). Assuming θ = 0
just makes stronger the potential impact of measurement error. This is because,
for a given variance of the measurement error, higher values of θ would make βˆ1
bigger, making it harder to find convergence as a result of measurement error. The
24The variance of V (ζit−1) can be obtained from the total variance in reported






















Figure 4.15: Measurement error Simulation
assumption that transitory earnings and the idiosyncratic measurement error have
equal variances has no further basis than pure convenience.25 Finally, the value of
the parameter βˆ1 selected for the simulation is -0.438, which is the average of the
βˆ1t calculated for each panel t with Least Squares.
Figure 4.15 shows the ratio of the variance of the measurement error to the
variance of initial reported earnings, as a function of ρ and α. This ratio is some-
times called the noise-to-signal ratio. The graph plots how big this ratio must be
in order to give an OLS parameter of βˆ1t = −0.438. Hence, the lower this ratio is
on the graph, the more pernicious is the effect of measurement error on the OLS
estimates, (i.e. it is easier for them to be biased towards finding convergence).
This graph shows that in order for the convergence result to be completely due
to measurement error, the noise-to-signal ratio needs to be at least 40% (when
α = 0), and higher if α is negative. This is a relatively high noise-to-signal ra-
tio. For comparison purposes, for the U.S. Bound and Krueger (1991) found this
25In the study of Pischke (1995) for the U.S., the magnitudes of these components
are found to be roughly the same, but this result varied for different time periods.
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ratio to be around 28% in their sample of men in the CPS. Although, without
further information coming from validation studies applied to Mexico, it cannot
be evaluated whether such numbers are too high or not, it seems unlikely that the
convergence result obtained is entirely due to measurement error.26
The second issue studied is the impact of measurement error on the parameter
estimates of the conditional mobility equation (4.4). In equation (4.10), i.e.





st(l,m)pilm + ((α+ 1)ηit + (θ − ρ)ζit−1 + ωit)
it was shown that if earnings were measured with error, initial reported earnings
would be correlated with the error term. This, in turn would lead to biased esti-
mates of all the parameters in the equation, if estimated by Least Squares. The
approach taken here is to use a series of regressors as instruments for the initial
level of earnings yit−1, and use the predicted measure of yˆit−1 as a regressor in
the conditional mobility equation. The instruments include all the regressors in
(4.4) (i.e., age, education, gender, sector, and regional dummies), as well as wealth
proxies and occupation dummies.
Instead of doing a simple 2-Stages Least Squares (2SLS) to correct for the
measurement error bias, I estimate a whole system of equations by 3-Stages Least
Squares (3SLS). The equations jointly estimated are
yit−1 = Ziγt−1 +Xit−1κt−1 + (αεit−1 + ζit−1)
yit = Ziγt +Xitκt + (αεit + ζit)





st(l,m)pilm + ((α + 1)ηit + (θ − ρ)ζit−1 + ωit)
26There is a region of values for α, ρ where it is impossible to generate such
convergence pattern. In particular, the range of values forming the flat part on
the top of Figure 4.15, and the area that follows afterwards, are ranges of values
where convergence cannot arise.
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Estimating this system by 3SLS partially corrects the measurement error bias
(in the same way the standard 2SLS-IV estimator does), but in addition to that it
can be used to perform a specification test for the structure of the earnings model
described in equations (4.2)-(4.4). The assumed structural form is testable, since
equation (4.4) (the third equation on the system) was derived from the first two
equations by assuming that the error term εit is autocorrelated. In particular, the
restrictions γ˜t = γt − ρtγt−1 and pilm = κt(m) − ρtκt−1(l) are testable using the
information from earnings equations in the first and final periods, together with
the mobility equation. Such test provides information on whether the assumed
structure is rejected by the data or not.
The results of the 3SLS estimations are presented in two parts. First, the
parameter estimates for (ρˆ3SLSt − 1) are presented in Figure 4.16. Then the full
regression results for the pooled subperiods are included in Tables 4.5 and 4.6.
As it can be appreciated in Figure 4.16 once the instrumentation is performed
the conditional mobility appears to be divergent for some of the early periods
in the sample, but it becomes convergent afterwards. In general, the estimated
conditional convergence rates are smaller than the ones estimated via LS.27
The analysis of the full regression results in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 shows some
differences with respect to the OLS estimations in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. In particular,
the effects of human capital variables on mobility are smaller. Age variables are
not always statistically significant, exhibiting a increasing concave pattern only
during the aftermath of the Peso crisis. Education has a positive effect most of the
periods in the specification in levels, but after the Peso crisis the U-pattern appears
again with an inflexion point around 6 yrs. of education. This convex pattern is
27The standard errors in the 3SLS estimations are quite small most likely due
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Figure 4.16: 3SLS. Conditional Mobility Parameter
also found in most of the periods for the logarithmic specification, with an inflexion
point fluctuating between 6 and 10 years of education. Being male has a positive
effect on mobility, but the effect is much smaller than the one obtained in the LS
regression. Finally, the patterns of conditional mobility by sector transition look
similar to the ones estimated under LS. The regional dummies are not significant
in many cases, but for most of the cases the US Border and North regions have a
higher conditional mobility.28
28With the exception of the period 1987-93 for the US Border cities.
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Table 4.5: 3SLS Regression by Periods. Levels. Dep. Var.: Change in Reported Earnings
Q1:87-Q2:94 Q3:94-Q1:99 Q2:99-Q4:02
Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.)
Initial Earnings -0.043 *** -0.187 *** -0.096 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age
Linear 11.147 34.551 ** -33.537 *
(17.58) (14.19) (19.73)
Squared -0.194 -0.450 ** 0.346
(0.22) (0.18) (0.24)
Education
Linear -17.619 -59.777 *** -22.235
(14.98) (12.46) (17.85)
Squared 2.301 *** 5.395 *** 2.127 **
(0.74) (0.59) (0.84)
Male 95.379 ** 70.771 ** 62.262
(40.28) (31.68) (43.60)
Sector Transitions
Unemployed to Informal Worker 4332.743 *** 3217.986 *** 4296.387 ***
(155.43) (103.84) (173.67)
Unemployed to Informal Self-employed 5649.411 *** 3976.265 *** 5285.783 ***
(146.82) (98.56) (168.86)
Unemployed to Formal Self-employed 13180.098 *** 12411.062 *** 13286.223 ***
(482.10) (292.52) (574.57)
Unemployed to Formal Worker 4888.759 *** 4085.576 *** 5154.720 ***
(138.09) (91.93) (159.33)
Informal Worker to Unemployed -3827.637 *** -2653.410 *** -3655.622 ***
(156.54) (99.18) (172.06)
Informal Worker to Informal Worker 493.490 *** 578.438 *** 644.917 ***
(188.54) (116.38) (208.29)
Informal Worker to Informal Self-employed 1801.668 *** 1324.286 *** 1579.085 ***
(186.54) (116.46) (207.45)
Informal Worker to Formal Self-employed 9111.391 *** 9050.538 *** 9616.414 ***
(279.79) (385.59) (367.22)
Informal Worker to Formal Worker 1042.026 *** 1394.146 *** 1458.778 ***
(184.53) (114.53) (205.23)
Informal Self-employed to Unemployed -4979.779 *** -3368.817 *** -4493.590 ***
(147.09) (93.00) (163.61)
Informal Self-employed to Informal Worker -635.633 *** -130.672 -194.015
(186.48) (116.42) (207.69)
Informal Self-employed to Informal Self-employed 670.471 *** 618.488 *** 745.816 ***
(180.38) (110.97) (202.38)
Informal Self-employed to Formal Self-employed 8015.395 *** 8294.042 *** 8752.673 ***
(227.60) (178.64) (265.68)
Informal Self-employed to Formal Worker -95.897 688.850 *** 629.868 ***
(180.35) (112.10) (202.41)
Formal Self-employed to Unemployed -1.10e+04 *** -9626.783 *** -1.16e+04 ***
(280.26) (201.61) (614.66)
Formal Self-employed to Informal Worker -6473.768 *** -6303.426 *** -7283.754 ***
(257.47) (248.90) (328.12)
Formal Self-employed to Informal Self-employed -5136.017 *** -5551.103 *** -6399.542 ***
(218.29) (163.02) (261.32)
Formal Self-employed to Formal Self-employed 2126.333 *** 2167.275 *** 1667.414 ***
(247.91) (196.46) (295.24)
Formal Self-employed to Formal Worker -5920.108 *** -5383.258 *** -6532.291 ***
(219.83) (166.09) (261.98)
Formal Worker to Unemployed -4272.175 *** -3337.792 *** -4375.583 ***
(137.25) (83.74) (148.90)
Formal Worker to Informal Worker 102.979 -36.649 -11.295
(184.54) (115.08) (206.24)




Formal Worker to Formal Self-employed 8685.365 *** 8402.423 *** 8915.297 ***
(229.01) (186.66) (267.00)




US Border -178.441 ** 233.129 *** 133.992 *
(80.22) (56.90) (77.18)
North 53.027 75.213 ** 136.869 ***
(48.37) (37.50) (52.03)
Center 20.800 -31.795 127.379 **
(49.21) (40.61) (55.71)
South -92.753 -137.895 -54.463
(125.75) (91.28) (117.07)
Constant -594.602 -942.625 *** 384.103
(387.20) (298.34) (438.81)
R-squared 0.0534 0.2086 0.1139
N 98318 83107 55411
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.6: 3SLS Regression by Periods. Dep. Var.: Change in Reported Log-Earnings
Q1:87-Q2:94 Q3:94-Q1:99 Q2:99-Q4:02
Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.) Coef./(s.e.)
Initial Log-Earnings -0.0330 *** -0.1057 *** -0.0894 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Age
Linear -0.0005 0.0040 ** -0.0029
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Squared -0.0000 -0.0001 ** 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education
Linear -0.0051 *** -0.0018 -0.0081 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Squared 0.0004 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0004 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.0143 *** 0.0210 *** 0.0111 **
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Sector Transitions
Informal Worker to Informal Worker (omitted)
Informal Worker to Informal Self-employed 0.2033 *** 0.1760 *** 0.1689 ***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Informal Worker to Formal Self-employed 0.7596 *** 0.9149 *** 0.8380 ***
(0.022) (0.040) (0.035)
Informal Worker to Formal Worker 0.1843 *** 0.3125 *** 0.2602 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Informal Self-employed to Informal Worker -0.1915 *** -0.1580 *** -0.1732 ***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
Informal Self-employed to Informal Self-employed 0.0102 0.0181 ** -0.0035
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Informal Self-employed to Formal Self-employed 0.5637 *** 0.7513 *** 0.6593 ***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.023)
Informal Self-employed to Formal Worker -0.0077 0.1571 *** 0.0891 ***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Formal Self-employed to Informal Worker -0.6897 *** -0.7362 *** -0.7897 ***
(0.019) (0.026) (0.030)
Formal Self-employed to Informal Self-employed -0.4881 *** -0.5537 *** -0.6136 ***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.022)
Formal Self-employed to Formal Self-employed 0.0635 *** 0.1782 *** 0.0488 *
(0.020) (0.023) (0.027)
Formal Self-employed to Formal Worker -0.5067 *** -0.4145 *** -0.5251 ***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.022)
Formal Worker to Informal Worker -0.1796 *** -0.2439 *** -0.2317 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Formal Worker to Informal Self-employed 0.0219 ** -0.0714 *** -0.0638 ***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Formal Worker to Formal Self-employed 0.5733 *** 0.6602 *** 0.5989 ***
(0.018) (0.021) (0.023)




US Border -0.0295 *** 0.0553 *** 0.0174 *
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
North 0.0003 0.0201 *** 0.0341 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Center 0.0026 -0.0020 0.0298 ***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
South -0.0135 -0.0165 -0.0071
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
Constant 0.3332 *** 0.6335 *** 0.8357 ***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.048)
R-squared 0.0332 0.1050 0.0933
N 95602 79649 53851
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.7: Specification Tests for the Conditional Earnings Model
Levels Logarithms
Period χ stat p-value χ stat p-value
Q1:87-Q2:93 25.11 0.456 6.06 0.993
Q3:94-Q1:99 59.21 0.000 96.99 0.000
Q2:99-Q4:01 13.29 0.973 13.45 0.706
To end this section the results for the tests of the structural relationships are
presented in Table 4.7. The test is a joint test of the hypotheses γ˜t = γt − ρtγt−1
and pilm = κt(m) − ρtκt−1(l). The results show that the data fail to reject these
hypotheses during the first and last periods of the sample. This is a positive
thing, since it means that the assumed structure does not contradict the data.
However, for the years in the aftermath of the Peso crisis the data strongly rejects
the model proposed. This means that the shock that came after this crisis altered
the dynamic structure of earnings, and mobility cannot be described by the same
model that explained reasonably well the other periods. A more careful study on
what is the structure of earnings dynamics during this period is an interesting
topic that deserves further research.
4.4.4 Attrition Bias and Non-Response
In this section the potential effects of attrition and non-reporting in the panel are
studied. In particular, the bounds
E(∆yit|yit−1, zi = 1)P (zi = 1|yit−1)
E(∆yit|yit−1, zi = 1)P (zi = 1|yit−1) + P (zi = 0|yit−1)
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of partial identification of E(∆yit|yit−1) are presented.
Figure 4.17 shows the estimated kernel and the partial identification bounds for
the unconditional mobility expectation E(∆yit|yit−1). The graph plots the results
for some select years. The solid line in the figures displays the kernel estimates
for the individuals with complete information. As expected from the previous
analysis, these estimates have a negative slope, especially for high-earners. The
dotted lines in the graph denote the lower and upper bounds of the identification
region H[E(∆yit|yit−1)]. Recalling, the meaning of this region is that, without
further assumptions, E(∆yit|yit−1) can lie anywhere inside these bounds.
As it can be seen, for 1987 and 1989 it cannot be ruled out that the mobility
was not convergent, since the identification region contains the zero line inside
it.29 For 1995 and 2001 the result of convergence still holds in the presence of
attrition. In general, the results change depending on the year selected, but the loss
of information due to attrition and non-reporting is substantial. One interesting
result to note is that the bounds become wider for rich individuals. The reason for
this is that rich individuals are more prone to not reporting their earnings, hence
the probability of including them in the sample is smaller.
The results presented only focused on the impact of attrition in the uncon-
ditional mobility estimates, but they are indicative of the perverse effects of this
problem in terms of loss of information. This loss of information will be carried to
other mobility estimates (e.g. conditional mobility parameters, aggregate mobility
indices, etc.) using this data.
Before closing this section it is important to remark that the bounds previously
presented are the more negative scenario that can be faced. In particular, unlike
29Notice however, that the bounds are much narrower for 1987. This is because
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Note: Epachenikov Kernel employed.
Earnings are measured in Mx Pesos (2002=100)
Panel Q1:01−Q1:02
Figure 4.17: Partial Identification Bounds on Unconditional Mobility Expectation
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other treatments of the attrition problem, no assumptions about the attrition
process were made. If one starts building up extra assumptions (e.g., a fraction x of
the population with missing values is actually missing at random), tighter bounds
can be obtained and more positive conclusions will be reached. One interesting
line of research to pursue would be to find a good instrument that is related to
earnings, but not to attrition.30
This section, rather than giving a completely negative panorama of the effects
of missing data on the analysis, attempts to call for caution in the presence of
such high levels of attrition. The results presented throughout the dissertation are
still meaningful for the subsample of the population with complete information.
To what extent they can be extended to the whole urban population is something
that requires more analysis.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter studied the relationship between different measures of initial advan-
tage and earnings mobility, as well as the impact of socioeconomic characteristics
of the individual on earnings mobility.
The answer to the question of “Are the most advantaged individuals gaining
more (losing less) in terms of earnings changes?” is that no; in the majority of the
estimations the most advantaged individuals either keep their advantage or lose
more than the rest. When reported earnings are taken as the measure of initial
advantage, having a higher initial advantage is found to be negatively associated
30Clearly, such an instrument is difficult to find since, if earnings affect the
probability of exiting the panel or of not reporting earnings, then any variable
causing earnings can not be used as an instrument. The candidates must be
variables caused by earnings or having a common cause with earnings.
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with mobility. In other words, there is convergence in earnings between high-
earners and low-earners. This convergence fluctuates over time, but its magnitude
is rather stable. However, there is evidence suggesting that this result is reflecting
an adjustment of earnings from a transitory shock back to its more permanent
level. For this reason, when the relationship between mobility and several proxy
measures for permanent advantage is considered, there is much less convergence
or no convergence at all. In these estimations, a low convergence pattern is found
during the late nineties-early 00’s, and the only case of strong convergence in
earnings occurs right after the 1994 Peso crisis. This episode led to convergence
in earnings levels, but not in logarithms. This indicates that during this period
high-earners lost more than everybody else in absolute terms, but their losses were
proportional to their higher initial earnings.
In general, what these results imply is that, most of the times, the mobility ex-
perienced over a year does not alter the permanent advantage of individuals. These
results should lead to reinterpreting some of the conclusions reached in Chapter
3. In particular, the conclusion that mobility equalized earnings over time be-
tween initial earnings quintile groups is most likely arising because of adjustments
of earnings to transitory shocks. As shown in this chapter, it was only during
the aftermath of the 1994 Peso crisis that mobility led to convergence between the
earnings of permanently advantaged individuals and the ones of individuals perma-
nently disadvantaged. In these years, the negative effects of the crisis were spread
throughout the economy and not even high-earners managed to avoid losses.
Regarding the answers to the question “What is the ceteris paribus impact of
socioeconomic characteristics of the individual on earnings mobility?” in general,
it is found that ceteris paribus more education leads to negative mobility for in-
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dividuals with low levels of education, but after a certain point more education
is associated with upward conditional mobility (the inflexion point fluctuates be-
tween 3 and 10 years of education depending on the model). Being male has a
strong positive effect on mobility, and age has a small, but positive effect also.
Holding everything else constant, transitions into formal self-employment are
the ones that bring the largest gains (smallest losses), while transitions into infor-
mal wage work are associated with the largest losses (smallest gains), excluding
of course the movements into unemployment. Transitions into formal wage work
and informal self-employment are between the two previous categories. In general,
it seems that transitions to informal self-employment bring more positive mobility
than the ones into formal wage work. However, this result is sometimes reversed
in the period following the 1994 Peso crisis. One problem with the previous results
is that in the case of self-employed individuals, it is not possible to discern how
much of the reported earnings are payments to the labor factor, and how much
are returns to physical capital. Finally, living in cities along the US Border and
in the North brings upward conditional mobility, while living in the Center and
South brings more negative conditional mobility.
Finally, the answer to the question of “How does the impact of initial earnings
on mobility change once the effect of these determinants is accounted for?” it is
found that, holding everything else constant, initial earnings are negatively related
to earnings mobility, meaning that individuals converge to their own conditional
mean. This conditional convergence rate is homogenous for most of the population,
except for the cases of education and sector groups. In these cases, the individuals
with higher earnings (the ones with higher education and the formal self-employed,
respectively) present smaller convergence rates, i.e., for these individuals a shock
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to their earnings was more persistent. Also, the conditional convergence rate is
slightly stronger than the unconditional one. This means that the overall impact
of the individual socioeconomic characteristics generates divergence in earnings.
Simulations on the impact of measurement error show that this error needs to
be quite large in order to be the sole reason underlying the convergence results
found in the unconditional mobility regression with reported earnings. Needless to
say, not much else can be said without a proper validation study on the amount of
measurement error that applies for a country like Mexico. It is important to remark
that the results found for the unconditional relationship between mobility and
permanent advantage are not affected by this measurement error. The effects of
measurement error on the conditional mobility estimates cannot be fully controlled,
but the instrumented conditional mobility estimates are smaller than the ones
obtained under the assumption of no measurement error.
The amount of attrition in the panel and of non-reporting of the earnings
variable leads to great losses of information that can create serious problems to
the estimations previously presented. In this chapter, the effects of these two
problems are assessed by means of partial identification analysis. This analysis
estimates a whole region in which the conditional expectations of interest may lie,
given the amount of information revealed by the data.
The partial identification bounds estimated are large and, depending on the
year selected, they sometimes challenge the convergence results obtained in the
unconditional mobility estimations. Although the case analyzed in this chapter
is the worst case scenario in terms of the potential impact of attrition, the find-
ings obtained warn against generalizing the results to the whole urban population
without further research on this topic.
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4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Proofs for Expressions in Section 4.3.4
This appendix presents derivations of equation (4.9) and establishes the consistency
of the IV parameter estimating the relationship between earnings mobility and
permanent advantage.
Proof of (4.9)
Note first that, under the measurement error model described by (4.5)-(4.8),
the estimated covariance between reported mobility and initial reported earnings
equals
cov(∆yit, yit−1) = cov(∆yPit + (1 + α)∆εit +∆ζit, y
P
it−1 + (1 + α)εit−1 + ζit−1)
with yPit ⊥ εit ⊥ ζit. Hence
cov(∆yit, yit−1) = cov(∆yPit , y
P
it−1) + (1 + α)
2cov(∆εit, εit−1) + cov(∆ζit, ζit−1)
= cov(∆y∗it, y
∗
it−1) + α(2 + α)(ρ− 1)V (εit−1) + (θ − 1)V (ζit−1)





it−1), gives the biased OLS βˆ1 parameter in expression (4.9).
Proof of unbiasedness of the IV parameter estimating the relation-
ship between earnings mobility and predicted permanent advantage.
First notice that the unbiasedness of yˆit−1 follows because if measured earnings
yit equal yit = y
P
it +(1+α)εit+ζit, and if permanent earnings are the component of
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earnings determined by a vector of variables Wit affecting permanent advantage,
i.e., yPit = WitΓt, then the first-stage regression of yit−1 on Wit will give unbiased
estimators of Γt, by the assumed orthogonality between y
P
it , εit, and ζit. With these
Γˆt the predicted yˆit−1 will also be unbiased.






1 yˆit−1 + uit
will give unbiased estimators of βP1 , by the aforementioned orthogonality conditions
and the fact that ∆yit = ∆y
P
it + (1 + α)∆εit +∆ζit.
4.6.2 Convergence Parameter Estimates With and With-
out the Unemployed
Figure 4.18 shows that when estimating equation (4.1) in levels it does not make a
difference whether unemployed individuals are included or not. In both cases, the
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Figure 4.18: OLS Unconditional Mobility Parameter. With and Without Unemployed.
Chapter 5
Testing Segmentation in Mexican Labor
Markets
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter it was shown that sector transitions played an important
role in affecting earnings mobility. The results of chapters 3 and 4 show that, both
unconditionally and conditionally, there is a large premium for being formal when
comparing formal wage work to informal wage work, and formal self-employment
to informal self-employment as destination sectors. Whether this constitutes evi-
dence for segmentation or not, is unclear. The possibility of endogeneity between
earnings mobility and the choice of sector makes the interpretation of the previous
comparisons inconclusive.
This chapter studies the issue of segmentation more closely, in particular it tests
whether individuals working in the informal sector have free access to formal sector
jobs, or whether formal sector jobs are rationed. It also analyzes the implications
of the structure of labor markets for earnings mobility.
The theory of labor market segmentation has a long tradition in economics
that dates back to the works of Furnivall (1939) and Boeke (1953), but more
importantly to the seminal work of Lewis (1954). This theory stipulates that
the functioning of the labor markets is not fully competitive. Instead, it posits
that two or more markets can operate at the same time, and in these markets
individuals of equal productive capacity get paid differently. More importantly, it
states that individuals cannot freely move into jobs in the better paying sectors
127
128
because such jobs are rationed. Although the original dualistic models were mainly
concerned with explaining the disparities between the urban industrialized areas
versus the backward rural areas in developing economies, soon extensions of this
model incorporated the analysis of urban informal markets (see for instance Fields,
1975). These models considered the informal sector as a second-best option that
workers take when they cannot find a formal sector job in the city.
This chapter tries to test whether such a model of segmentation applies for the
case of urban Mexico, and if that is the case, what are the earnings losses of those
individuals rationed out of the formal sector. It also tries to assess how many
of these segmented individuals manage to enter the formal sector in subsequent
periods, and what are the earnings gains associated with such transitions.
5.2 Previous Literature and Contribution
The literature on labor market segmentation has a long tradition in modern eco-
nomics. Its origins can be traced back to the seminal work of Lewis (1954) on
Dualism. This theory tried to explain the existence of an advanced urban indus-
trialized sector coexisting with a backward rural area in developing countries. This
model was quickly extended in many directions, many of which are not directly
related to the topic here studied.1
One of these extensions however, was the source for the study of segmentation
in urban labor markets. The seminal work of Harris and Todaro (1970) explored
the implications of this dualistic structure on rural-urban migration. In particular,
it provided an explanation for the migration flows from rural areas into the better
1For recent appraisals of this dualistic approach see Basu (1997); Fields (2004b)
and Ranis (forthcoming).
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paid urban industrialized ones, even in the presence of urban unemployment. The
main logic of this model is that jobs are rationed in the industrialized urban sector
and, assuming downward wage rigidities in the urban areas, rural migration would
take place up to the point where the rural marginal product of labor equals the
expected wage in the urban sector (the expectation coming from the fact that the
probability of finding an urban job is less than one).
The Harris-Todaro model was soon extended in many ways, one of which in-
corporated the existence of an urban informal sector. The model proposed by
Fields (1975) explained the creation of an urban informal sector as the result of
the need of urban unemployed workers to have some source of income. In other
words, many workers in urban areas couldn’t afford being unemployed and would
set up (or work at) an informal business that would provide them with a source
of income while waiting to gain access to a better paid formal sector job. This
characterization of the informal sector as a buffer zone, that provided second-class
types of jobs for workers rationed out of the formal sector, was very popular for
many years in the Development Economics literature. However, in the last decades
it has has been questioned.
Another tradition in the literature that proposed the existence of segmented
labor markets is the one started by the work of Doeringer and Piore (1971), which
had as main tenets the existence of low-wage jobs, usually with low returns to
human capital and bad working conditions, together with the rationing of good
jobs. This literature, contrary to the literature started by Lewis, arose as a way
to explain labor markets in developed economies, and generated on its own a vast
amount of research (see Cain, 1976; Dickens and Lang, 1985, for a review of the
literature).
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Almost parallel to the development of this literature another tradition in eco-
nomics viewed the existence of several sectors in the labor market as the product of
the natural alignment of comparative advantage forces. The seminal paper of Roy
(1951) provided a rationale for sectoral allocation according to the comparative ad-
vantages that each individual had at different economic activities. The model also
showed how this sector allocation could generate a skewed distribution of income.
Soon, the framework set by the Roy model became the workhorse for studying not
only sectoral allocation issues, but many others like occupational choice, migration
decisions, unionization, marital status, to mention just a few. A recent appraisal
of this model exploring its empirical content can be found on Heckman and Honore´
(1990).
A crucial feature of the Roy model relevant for the present discussion is that it
assumed that individuals are free to move across sectors. In other words, although
the Roy model can explain the co-existence of “good jobs” and “bad jobs”, it
differs from the dualistic models in that it assumes no rationing among sectors for
this to occur. Under this framework, if the informal sector is a worse paid/bad
conditions sector it is because of its inherent technological characteristics, and the
productive characteristics of the workers that self-select themselves to work there.
These two competing views of the informal labor markets have crucial dif-
ferences in terms of what they would recommend as policies to ameliorate the
conditions of informal sector workers. In its most simple form, a dualistic model
of labor markets would call for an expansion of the formal sector so that it could
absorb the workers stuck in the informal sector. On the other hand, if the informal
sector arose because of the self-selection mechanism posited by the Roy model, ex-
panding the formal sector per se would not solve the problem. Instead a better
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option would be to enhance the productivity of the informal sector workers.
Since these models present contrasting views on how the labor markets op-
erate, it is important to empirically test which one of them (if any) provides a
better explanation of the labor markets. This is particularly relevant in develop-
ing economies, due to the large size of the informal sector in these economies.
There have been several attempts to test for the segmentation of labor markets.
Although initially it was thought that the poor quality of informal sector jobs
was enough evidence to prove that formal sector jobs were rationed, economists
soon realized that a formal way of testing this assumption was necessary. In
the beginning, tests were attempted by classifying workers into good and bad
jobs according to their job characteristics, and comparing either the earnings or
the earnings functions of workers with comparable human capital across these
two types of jobs. This approach was abandoned because if a Roy model was
true and workers could freely move across sectors, and if this decision depended
on unmeasured factors, then these comparisons would not test segmentation, but
rather just document that the formal and the informal sectors were in fact different
(Rosenzweig, 1988, provides a discussion of these and other criticisms).
Among the first papers that explicitly tried to account for issues of self-selection
while testing for segmentation was Dickens and Lang (1985). Their model was a
switching regression model with unknown separation, i.e., it allowed for individuals
to self-select into sectors, but it did not assume beforehand the sector the workers
were in. Instead, this feature was implicitly estimated in the model. For this model,
evidence of segmentation would be if a two-wage equation specification, with one
wage profile increasing in human capital variables and the other one being flat, is
preferred over a single equation model. In their application using PSID data for
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1980, the authors find evidence of segmentation in US labor markets.
This type of tests came under criticisms of several kinds. In a paper published
shortly after, Heckman and Hotz (1986) questioned the validity of such a test.
The most important criticism directed at this methodology was that the evidence
favoring a two-wage equation specification could indicate instead the existence of
a highly nonlinear wage equation.2
Another test of segmentation was proposed by Magnac (1991) in an application
to Colombian women in the 80’s. His model was a multivariate Tobit used to ana-
lyze the joint decision between not entering the labor force, entering the informal
sector, entering the formal sector, or being unemployed (if no job is found). The
test of segmentation was a test of relative costs of entry into the formal sector.
These costs were assumed to be proportional to wages, and could be interpreted
as queueing into the formal sector. Magnac found no evidence of segmentation
with this data; however, specification tests of his model turned out to give little
support to the distributional assumptions implicit in the model.3
A series of papers have tried to test segmentation by comparing wage equations
corrected for self-selection into the formal and informal sectors, but the methods
used to correct for sample selectivity assume for starters that individuals choose
their sector of employment in order to maximize either their income or their utility.
This assumption is problematic, since this free choice among sectors is precisely the
issue being tested. Papers following this approach are Gindling (1991) for Costa
2A recent application of a methodology similar to the one of Dickens and Lang,
but addressing some of the criticisms of Heckman and Hotz, is Basch and Paredes-
Molina (1996) for Chile. The authors claim to find evidence of dualism, but not
of rationing.
3In particular, the assumptions of quadrivariate normality and homoskedastic-
ity were rejected by the data.
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Rica, Marcouiller et al. (1997) for Mexico, Peru and El Salvador, and Thomas and
Valle´e (1996) for Cameroon. Since their methodology rules out from the beginning
the possibility of job rationing in the formal sector, it is hard to know how to
interpret the diverse results presented in those papers.
An interesting approach has been proposed by Pradhan and van Soest (1995)
in their study of segmentation in urban Bolivia in the late eighties. In this paper
the authors study whether an Ordered Probit (which assumes a ranked choice
among Formal sector jobs, Informal sector jobs, and Unemployment) describes
the data better than a Multinomial Probit, which assumes no ranking among the
options. The results they find is that the Multinomial Probit is a better model
for women, while for men no model can be preferred. Although this model is an
interesting empirical application, it has the disadvantage of not modeling explicitly
the rationing process.
Two recent approaches to test for segmentation are the ones proposed by Pisani
and Paga´n (2003) and Navarro-Lozano and Schrimpf (2004). The first paper pro-
vides a test of segmentation by explicitly modeling the rationing of formal sector
jobs, while the second one generates a full distribution of counterfactual wages
(and not only expected values, as usually done in the literature) for workers in the
formal and informal sector. Since this dissertation follows the methodology pro-
posed by Pisani and Paga´n (2003), the methodology of this paper will be discussed
more carefully later on. Regarding the second paper, it will be discussed in the
section dealing with applications of this literature to the Mexican case.
Finally, a recent test based on propensity score matching has been proposed by
Pratap and Quintin (forthcoming). In this paper the authors compare the wages
of formal sector workers with a control wage generated by a weighted average of
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wages of informal sector workers, matched by the propensity score method. The
authors also perform Difference-in-Difference estimations to control for the effects
of unobserved heterogeneity. Segmentation is considered to exist in this model if a
formal sector wage premium is found. The authors apply their method to urban Ar-
gentina in the early nineties and they find no evidence of segmentation. Although
this method has the advantage of not relying on distributional assumptions as the
previous ones, it considers monetary factors only. Excluding non-monetary factors
could lead to wrong inferences; consider for instance if formal sector non-monetary
benefits outweigh by far the benefits of working in the informal sector, then work-
ers could be willing to accept a pay cut in the formal sector in order to receive
those benefits.4
5.2.1 Studies on Labor Market Segmentation for Mexico
Out of the topics studied in this dissertation, informality and segmentation in labor
markets is by far the one that has received more attention for the Mexican case.
In a long series of papers, William Maloney has questioned the segmented view
of the labor markets for Mexico (and Latin America) (Maloney, 1998, 1999, 2003;
Maloney et al., 2004; Maloney, 2004; Maloney and Bosch, 2005, are some examples
of this literature). In a nutshell, Maloney questions the idea that informal self-
employment is an undesirable state where workers end only when they cannot find
formal sector jobs. Instead, he proposes that many of the informal self-employed
are willingly so, because the overall utility they derive from these jobs is higher than
the one they would obtain in the formal sector. He argues that many times formal
4Actually in their empirical application the authors consider further tests of job
satisfaction, but due to data limitations the evidence they present is not conclusive.
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sector benefits are of low quality; and that, in the case of Mexico, informal workers
can enjoy such benefits if a family member is employed in the formal sector. Also,
informal self-employment allows workers to have flexible working hours, something
that the overregulated formal labor market does not allow. This flexibility in hours
is particularly important for female workers. Finally, he notes that many of these
informal self-employed have low human capital and hence would receive a low pay
in the formal sector if they were to enter it.
The fact that the informal self-employment sector is a heterogeneous one, hav-
ing individuals with different reasons for being there has been acknowledged before
by proponents of the segmented view of the labor markets (see for instance Fields,
1990). However, recognizing this heterogeneity in the informal sector assumes the
existence of a group of workers who are restricted from obtaining a formal sector
job. Furthermore, most of the evidence in the aforementioned papers has been
concerned with the informal self-employed, and much less has been said about the
informal wage workers (who work for the owner of an informal firm). While the
studies of Maloney have gathered a fair amount of evidence supporting this het-
erogeneity in the informal sector, the issue of how many of the informal workers
are informal by force and not by choice, cannot be resolved unless a direct test of
segmentation is performed.
A recent paper that tries to directly test segmentation for the Mexican case is
Navarro-Lozano and Schrimpf (2004). In this paper, the authors propose a Monte
Carlo Markov Chain method similar to the one used in Carneiro et al. (2003),
where a joint model of earnings, sector choice and schooling is estimated. The
model is comprised of a set of mutually independent factors that jointly affect the
aforementioned dependent variables, and that account for the unmeasured char-
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acteristics of the individuals. Under this framework, segmentation would occur
if (after controlling for a set of individual characteristics) workers in the informal
sector experience (on average) gains by moving to the formal sector that are higher
than the average gains of workers already there. This constitutes a test of segmen-
tation because it would mean that, ceteris paribus, the movers started at a lower
position; something that these workers could have avoided if sector mobility was
unconstrained.5 The authors test their results with the ENEU in 1997, and exclude
the self-employed from their estimations. They find no evidence of segmentation
for this year. While the model proposed by Navarro-Lozano and Schrimpf is richer
than any other previously encountered in the literature, it has a serious drawback.
The problem is that the way the authors model sector choice, implicitly assumes
that workers are free to move across sectors in order to maximize their utility.
This, as previously mentioned, is problematic because this assumption is precisely
what is being tested.
Finally, a set of studies that, although do not test directly for segmentation,
they provide interesting evidence on sector transitions and earnings mobility is
Gong et al. (2000) and Gong and van Soest (2002). The first paper uses a dynamic
Multinomial Logit to analyze the transition patterns between the informal and
formal sector, and non-participation. The authors use the ENEU for periods pre
and post the 1994 peso crisis. Their main findings are that entry and exit rates for
the formal sector are lower than for the informal sector, the probability of formal
sector employment increases with education level, while the probability of working
5This comparison of average gains (rather than earnings levels), conditional
on a set of individual characteristics, allows for testing segmentation even if the
agents are utility maximizers (instead of just income maximizers). This occurs
if one assumes, as the authors do, that the difference in non-monetary benefits
between sectors is fixed over time.
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in the informal sector decreases with family income. The authors interpret these
results as providing support for the view that the informal sector is a temporary
state for workers rationed out of the formal sector.
The second paper (Gong and van Soest, 2002) analyzes jointly quarterly wage
mobility and sector transitions (between formal and informal jobs) by means of
a dynamic Random effects model. Their main findings in the wage equation are
that wage differentials between the formal and the informal sector increase with
education level, and that the lagged sector state does not affect current wages. In
the sector transition equation they find that the probability of formal sector em-
ployment strongly increases with the wage differential between formal and informal
sector jobs. Although this paper is one of the first attempts to jointly model earn-
ings and sector choice in a dynamic setting for Mexico, it does not incorporates
the possibility of rationing in the sector choice equation.
The contribution of the present chapter is then to use the segmentation test
proposed in Pisani and Paga´n (2003), apply it to the Mexican case, and extend
their application by estimating selectivity-corrected earnings equations. The es-
timation of these earnings equations is crucial to obtain counterfactual earnings
for the individuals restricted out of the formal sector. These predicted earnings
serve to estimate the potential gains that such individuals could experience by
moving into the formal sector. In addition to that, this chapter exploits the panel
structure of the data to provide evidence on sectoral transitions and the actual
earnings mobility experienced by individuals who were predicted to be restricted




In order to test for segmentation in this chapter the workers’ decision to apply for a
formal sector job is modeled together with the employer’s decision to accept or not
such applicants. This sector choice model is the same of Pisani and Paga´n (2003),
which in turn base their analysis on the models of Poirier (1980) and Abowd and
Farber (1982).
The propensity of a worker i for working in the formal sector (denoted by V wi )
is assumed to be a linear function (in the parameters) of a set of socioeconomic
characteristics Z, i.e.,
V wi = Ziγw + v1i (5.1)
Among the factors that may influence the worker’s desire for a formal sector job
are his age, education level, gender, the region in which he works, his wealth,
his marital status, the family structure in his household, his desire to be an en-
trepreneur instead of a salaried worker, his ability to perform well in a formal
sector job, among many other things. Not all of these factors are indeed observed
by the econometrician. In the present application, the variables observed that
are included in the empirical specification are human capital variables (age and
education), gender, regional dummies, proxies for household wealth, and family
structure variables (a dichotomous variable for marital status and the number of
children and adults in the household). Unobserved factors like ability and desire
for entrepreneurship will be captured by the v1i term.
It is important to note that some of these factors may operate through many
channels. For instance, the workers’ human capital variables (like age and educa-
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tion) may affect the desire for a formal sector job through their effect on earnings,
but they may also have a direct effect on V wi . Note then that the specification
(5.1) is a reduced form that does not distinguish among these many channels.
Similarly, for the formal sector employer, a set of the worker characteristics X,
as well as his own characteristics will determine whether he offers or not a job to
the applicant. In particular, it will be assumed that the propensity for hiring an
applicant (denoted by V ei ) will be given by
V ei = Xiγe + v2i (5.2)
In this case it is assumed that the variables included in X are a subset of Z,
i.e., X ⊂ Z. This means that when deciding whether to hire or not an applicant a
formal sector employer only takes into account those characteristics that affect the
productivity and performance of the worker in the firm. In particular the variables
that constitute the X vector are human capital variables (age and education),
gender, and regional dummies for controls. Other characteristics that affect the
decision of the worker for applying to formal sector jobs, but that do not affect
his productivity in the firm (like household structure and wealth proxies), do not
influence the decision of the employer. An additional justification for why these
variables do not enter X is that, even if they were to have an effect on productivity,
they are not observed by the employer. As it will be clear below, these exclusion
restrictions imposed on X are crucial to the identification of the main components
of the model.
In the specification (5.2) it is also assumed the characteristics of the employer
will not be explicitly included as observed variables, instead they will be captured
in v2i, for reasons that will be explained below.
With equations (5.1) and (5.2) it is possible to specify the probability of a
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worker applying to a formal sector job, the probability of being hired conditional
on having applied to such job, and finally the probability of being a formal worker.
More specifically,
P (Apply = 1|Zi) = P (V wi > 0|Zi) = P (v1i > −Ziγw)
P (Hire = 1|Xi, Apply = 1) = P (V ei > 0|Xi, Apply = 1) = P (v2i > −Xiγe)
P (FormalWorker = 1|Zi) = P (Apply = 1|Zi)P (Hire = 1|Xi, Apply = 1)
The problem with this structure is that in practice one does not observe whether
an individual applied for a formal sector job or not. The ENEU in particular asks
unemployed individuals whether they had tried to start their own business or
searched for salaried work, but there is no indication about the whether those
options would take place in the formal or the informal sector. For the employed
individuals the question is even less informative since they only ask them whether
they have looked for another job.
In order to identify the separate probabilities, and answer whether there is
segmentation in labor markets, a bivariate probit model with partial observability
is applied. The origin of these models is Poirier (1980), where the conditions for
identification and estimation of the parameters of interest are stated. The version
applied in this chapter is closer to the simpler version of this model proposed by
Abowd and Farber (1982) in their study of queueing and union status in the US.
In particular, this chapter assumes that the error terms (v1i, v2i) in (5.1) and (5.2)
are bivariate normally distributed, i.e., (v1i, v2i) ∼ N(0,Σ), but the correlation
between these terms is zero, i.e., the errors are independent. Although this is a re-
strictive assumption,6 it will be used in this first approach, because the full model
that allows for a non-zero correlation between these error terms is harder to esti-
6It makes sense to believe that there are unobservable factors to the econome-
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mate.7 As Maddala (1983) notes, assuming independence between the error terms
(v1i, v2i) is equivalent to assuming that the sector choice process is sequential, i.e.,
first the worker applies to a formal sector job, and then a formal sector employer
decides whether to hire or not the applicant. A task for future work is to extend
the present methodology allowing for a non-zero correlation between these error
terms, and hence opening the possibility for a joint decision process.








where FW is the dichotomous indicator of whether an individual is a formal wage
worker or not, and Φ(·) is the standard normal distribution function.
Note that under this model the parameters γw, γe for (5.1) and (5.2) are es-
timated from a single dependent variable (the indicator FW ). This is why it is
crucial to have exclusion restrictions from the set of variables that affect the em-
ployer’s decision. Without these exclusion restrictions on X it would be impossible
to separately identify Φ(Ziγw) from Φ(Xiγe) in (5.3).
A difference between the likelihood model used in this chapter and the one
used by Abowd and Farber (1982) is that they use extra information on the job
rights of workers to assume that certain workers are not restricted from entering
the union. This restriction turns out to give them strong identifying power in
their application, but in the present context there is no variable that could play
an equivalent role.8 In any case the present application does not appear to need
trician that both the applicant and the employer observe and act upon. Consider
for instance the punctuality with which the worker showed up at the job interview.
7In such versions it is hard to obtain convergence of the Maximum Likelihood
algorithm, and many times the solutions lie on the boundary of the parameter
space, preventing the computation of the variances.
8An attempt was made to estimate a model similar to theirs by assuming that
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such extra identifying assumptions in order to reach a solution.
From this structure it is also clear why the few employer characteristics collected
by the survey are not included as observable variables in (5.1) and (5.2). Since the
survey contains information about the employer characteristics (mainly sector of
economic activity and firm size) only for the job at which the individual is currently
employed, it is not clear how to introduce them in the model. Consider for instance
how to interpret if one were to find that a dummy for working at service activities
impacts negatively P (Hire = 1|Xi, Apply = 1). Does it means that formal sector
jobs in services are harder to get? Or is it that individuals that got rejected in other
types of formal sector jobs actually turned to providing services in the informal
sector? What one would like to include is the characteristics of the potential
employers that the individual is considering, and not the firm variables after the
selection process has taken place.
This bivariate probit model nests as a particular case the standard probit which
assumes no segmentation. If the formal sector jobs are not rationed, then all that
would matter is whether a worker wants to be in the formal sector or not. Under
this structure a standard univariate probit applied over (5.1) would estimate all the
relevant parameters in the model.9 This nesting gives the basis for testing whether
formal sector jobs are rationed or not. In particular, a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test
any worker who is in the formal sector in the second period, who was also a
formal sector worker in the previous period and did not change sector of economic
activity (meaning manufacturing, services, construction, etc.) nor occupation,
was unrestricted from entering the formal sector, i.e., for this workers P (Hire =
1|Xi, Apply = 1) = 1. This version of the model failed to converge to a solution
and hence it was abandoned.
9To see that this is indeed a particular case of the more general bivariate model,
note that the univariate model can be derived from the bivariate likelihood function
in equation (5.3) if γe = 0 for all the individual variables and the constant term
γ0e is set high enough as to make Φ(Xiγe) = 1.
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can be applied to see whether the bivariate model describes the data better than
the univariate probit model. If the LR test favors the richer structure (5.1) and
(5.2) over the single probit model, and if there is a group of individuals for whom
the model predicts rejection in the formal sector, i.e., P (Hire = 0|Xi, Apply = 1),
then this will constitute evidence of segmentation in labor markets.10
Applying this methodology to test for segmentation in the labor markets was
first done by Pisani and Paga´n (2003). They made an application to the Nicaraguan
labor markets and found evidence of segmentation. The present chapter extends
their application by estimating earnings equations for each sector, correcting for
selectivity bias. The methodology for such estimations is presented in the next
section.
Before moving on to the next section it is important to mention that the analysis
performed excludes formal self-employed individuals11 and unemployed individuals.
The reason for excluding the unemployed workers is because the bivariate probit
structure proposed does not have room for the third choice of waiting another
period to keep searching for a better job. Furthermore, it is not evident how to
discern which of the unemployed are waiting for a better offer, and which ones
just cannot find any job at all. In any case, the number of unemployed individuals
in the subsample under study (individuals between 25-60 yrs. of age in the labor
force) is extremely small and hence their exclusion is likely to make no difference
for the estimations.
In the case of the formal self-employed, their exclusion from the sample is
10It is important to notice that this model could underestimate the degree of
segmentation if there are individuals who are discouraged from looking for formal
sector jobs.
11That is individuals who declare to be self-employed or bosses in firms that are
registered with the government or provide some sort of coverage to their workers.
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done because it is not clear what are the restrictions a worker faces in order to
become a formal self-employed. While in the case of a formal wage worker it is
clear that in principle an applicant would go through a screening process by the
employer; in the case of a formal self-employed the role played by the access to
capital necessary to start a formal sector firm seems to be crucial. Since the dataset
used in this dissertation is not rich on measures of capital, it is better to exclude
such individuals rather than wrongly impute to them a sector choice structure.
Also since this criticism on the importance of access to capital might extend
to a fraction of the informal self-employed, all the estimations in this chapter are
performed with and without these informal self-employed, to test if the conclusions
change.
5.3.2 Earnings Equations
An extension of the present chapter to the work of Pisani and Paga´n (2003) is to
move beyond the estimation of the discrete process (5.1) and (5.2), and estimate
earnings equations for each sector corrected for selectivity bias. This allows ob-
taining the effects of socioeconomic variables on earnings free of sample selectivity
bias. These estimates also allow estimating counterfactual earnings in the formal
sector for individuals working in the informal sector.
The earnings of the individual are related to his productive characteristics X
by
yiI = Xiβ + εi (5.4)
if he works in the informal sector, and by
yiF = Xi(β + pi) + εi (5.5)
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if he works in the formal sector.12
In practice the earnings of an individual are observed in only one sector at a
time, and the individuals are not randomly assigned into sectors. Hence, estimating
equations (5.4) and (5.5) by standard regression methods would lead to biased
estimates. In order to obtain unbiased estimates of the parameters in (5.4) and
(5.5), an adjustment for selectivity bias is required.
The selectivity-correction model followed in this chapter assumes trivariate nor-
mality between the error terms in equations (5.1), (5.2), and (5.5), i.e., (v1i, v2i, εi) ∼
N(0,Σ).13
Under these assumptions, it can be shown (see the appendix of this chapter)
that the expectation of the error term εi, conditional on the individual being in
the formal sector, is









and the expectation of εi conditional on the individual being in the informal sector
is
E(εi|FW = 0) = ρwIλwI + ρeIλeI
12The assumption that earnings in different sectors differ by a parametric shift
pi, but keep the same error structure εi, is necessary to obtain selectivity-corrected
estimates for the earnings equation in the informal sector. For an application with
similar assumptions see Tunalı (1986).
13This is equivalent to assuming that the error terms (v1i, v2i) are bivariate nor-
mal as previously stated in equations (5.1)-(5.2), and that the expectation of εi
conditional on (v1i, v2i) and Zi is linear. The independence between v1i and v2i is
maintained.






1− Φ(Ziγw)Φ(Xiγe) λeI =
−φ(Xiγe)Φ(Ziγw)
1− Φ(Ziγw)Φ(Xiγe) . (5.7)
The terms λwF , λeF , λwI , and λeI are the equivalent to the familiar Inverse
Mills’ Ratio in the standard Heckman selectivity correction model. In this case,
there are two correction terms for each sector, because in addition to the worker’s
decision to apply for a formal sector job, there is the decision of formal sector
employer on whether to hire or not a given applicant.
With this structure, the selectivity-corrected earnings equations to estimate are
yiI = Xiβ + ρwIλwI + ρeIλeI + εi (5.8)
yiF = Xi(β + pi) + ρwFλwF + ρeFλeF + εi (5.9)
The λ-terms can be constructed by using the estimates of γw and γe that arise
from eqn. (5.3). This two-step method has been analyzed in Poirier (1980) and
Tunalı (1986). Since these papers do not include the derivation of the selectivity
correction terms for the case when the individual is in the informal sector, the
derivation of these expressions in its more general form is included in the appendix
of this chapter. Expressions (5.6) and (5.7) are particular cases of that derivation.
Once equations (5.8) and (5.9) are estimated this permits generating counter-
factual expected earnings for a random individual with characteristics X, in the
sector in which he is not participating. These counterfactual predictions yFi and
yIi can be compared to the actual earnings of the individual. In particular, these
counterfactuals provide an estimate of the potential monetary gains of moving into
the formal sector for individuals restricted from entering that sector.
It is important to note that both the discrete choice models (5.1)-(5.2) as well
as the earnings equations (5.8) and (5.9), are not dynamic. The generalization of
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this type of models to a dynamic setting has not been done yet in the literature.
For this reason these models are estimated at the first period at which individuals
are interviewed. Using the first interview for each individual also eliminates any
potential negative effect of attrition from the panel. For the same compactness of
presentation reasons adduced in previous chapters, the models are estimated for
the pooled periods going from the 1st quarter 1987 to the 2nd quarter of 1993, the
3rd quarter of 1994 to the 1st quarter of 1999, and the 2nd quarter of 1999 to the
4th quarter of 2002.
Although the full panel is not exploited in the estimation of the structural
models, its information is used in exploring the evolution of earnings and sector
transitions for the individuals for whom the model was originally estimated. The
two main questions analyzed there will be: i) “How many of the individuals pre-
dicted to be restricted from entering the formal sector in period 1 enter into that
sector in subsequent periods?” and ii) “What is the actual earnings mobility expe-
rienced by rationed individuals if they manage to enter the formal sector in further
periods?”. The last question is formulated both unconditionally and controlling
for a set of individual characteristics. Analyzing these two issues sheds some light
on how easy it is to gain access to the formal sector in subsequent periods, and
what are the actual gains (as opposed to the predicted ones) of the individuals




The first results presented in this section pertain to the probit analysis for the
sector choice process. The results of these estimations are shown in Tables 5.1 -
5.4. The estimations are performed for two different specifications, one including
informal self-employed, and the other keeping only wage workers in the sample.
In each of these tables two sets of estimates are presented, one that assumes free
entry to the formal wage jobs (denominated “No Rationing Model”), and one that
allows for formal sector jobs to be rationed (labeled “Rationing Model”).
At the bottom of each of these tables the Likelihood Ratio statistic is reported
for the hypothesis test that the free entry model describes better the data. As
it can be seen, this hypothesis is soundly rejected in all of the specifications. In
other words, under the stated distributional and functional assumptions, this test
provides the basis for the claim that urban labor markets in Mexico are segmented.
This result is of relevance because it goes against all the previous findings reported
in the literature applied to Mexico.15 This means that if the implicit assumptions
of the empirical model are correct, in urban Mexico it would be incorrect to treat
entry into the formal sector as depending only on the decision of the worker.
Instead, whenever dealing with issues of sector choice, an explicit account for the
possibility of formal sector jobs rationing should be allowed.
The analysis of the “No Rationing” models, that assume free entry into the
formal sector, shows that, holding everything else constant, being younger, more
educated and female affects positively the probability of being formal in the model
15This literature was reviewed in section 5.2 of the chapter.
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that includes self-employed workers (Tables 5.1 and 5.2). However, when the ob-
servations are restricted to only wage workers the model indicates that being older,
more educated and male affects positively the probability of being a formal salaried
worker (Tables 5.3 and 5.4).
The regional effects vary depending on the specification, and on the periods un-
der scrutiny. In the model with self-employed, being in the North affects positively
the probability of being formal, while being on the US border affects it negatively
in the period going from 1987 to 1993, but positively after 1994. The model with
wage workers only, shows strong positive effects of being in a region other than
Mexico City.
Being married is sometimes positively associated with being a formal sector
worker, and having small children in the household is always negatively associated
with it. The effect of the number of adults living in the household varies depending
on the specification. In the model including self-employed it is always positive, but
not so in the model with wage workers only.
Finally, the effects of wealth proxy variables, like cluster average income and
dwelling characteristics are positive on the probability of being formal.16
Moving now to the analysis of the model where rationing is allowed, it is im-
portant to remember that here there are two equations being estimated. Namely,
the application decision of the worker to a formal sector job (reported under the
heading “Pr(A=1)” in the tables), and the formal sector employer’s decision to
accept such applicant (reported under the heading “Pr(E=1| A=1)”).
16The only exception is the variable “Type of Dwelling”. This is a categorical
variable that is decreasing in the quality of the type of dwelling the household lives
in. For instance, it takes the value 1 if the household lives in an owned house, 2 if
in an apartment, 4 if in a room on a roof, etc.
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Table 5.1: Probit of Sector Allocation. Informal Self-employed Included.Q1:87-Q2:93
No Rationing Model Rationing Model
Pr(Formal=1) Pr(A=1) Pr(E=1|A=1)
Age
Linear -0.0125 *** -0.0053 -0.0094 ***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.003)
Squared 0.0000 -0.0003 ** 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education
Linear 0.1261 *** 0.0231 ** 0.0852 ***
(0.004) (0.012) (0.003)
Squared -0.0029 *** 0.0139 *** -0.0017 ***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)




US Border -0.0464 *** 0.8199 *** -0.1451 ***
(0.013) (0.089) (0.014)
North 0.0543 *** -0.2632 *** 0.0776 ***
(0.011) (0.031) (0.010)
Center -0.0931 *** -0.1888 *** -0.0929 ***
(0.011) (0.029) (0.009)
South -0.0221 0.0021 -0.0385
(0.017) (0.087) (0.023)
Married 0.0298 *** -0.4688 ***
(0.013) (0.025)
Household Structure
# hh members >11yrs 0.0143 *** 0.0733 ***
(0.003) (0.006)
# hh members <12yrs -0.0313 *** -0.0993 ***
(0.004) (0.008)
Wealth Proxies
Cluster Average Income 0.0000 0.0001 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.0956 0.3238 0.6679 ***
(0.098) (0.229) (0.065)
No. Observations 197,221 197,221
Log-Likelihood -117,547.8 -115,708.6
LRT statistic 3678.4 p-value 0.000
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The decision of applying for a formal sector job is positively affected by the
education of the worker. The effect of age varies depending on the model and
the period considered. Most of the times being older increases the probability of











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Being a male has a large positive effect on the probability of applying to a
formal sector job in the model including self-employed, but it has a negative effect
in the model with wage workers only. This would mean that for a woman it is more
attractive to look for informal self-employment, probably because women, being
the persons doing all the housework, prefer jobs that allow them more flexible
schedules. Being married has a negative effect on the decision to apply for a
formal sector job in the sample including the self-employed, but it has a positive
effect in the sample with wage workers only.
The number of children in the household diminishes the probability of applying
for a formal sector job under all specifications (somebody has to take care of the
children and formal sector jobs do not offer flexible schedules). However, while the
number of adults increases the probability of applying to such jobs in the sample
with informal self-employed, the effect becomes negative in the sample with wage
workers only. This is a puzzling finding because independently of the sector the
worker is in, having fewer adults around who can take care of the children should
lead to a smaller desire for jobs that are not flexible in schedules.17
One variable that was not included in the analysis, but that might play a role
in the decisions analyzed, is whether the individual has a relative working in the
formal sector. This could discourage applying to formal sector jobs, because in
Mexico individuals can get health coverage if a close relative has a formal sector
job. The reason for not incorporating this variable in the analysis is that doing so
would require moving away from the framework of individual sector participation,
17While this finding could be due to an income effect, by which more adults in
the household lead to greater income per-capita, and hence allow the individual
worker to look for less demanding jobs in the informal sector, this does not explain
why the effect changes as we move from one sample to the other.
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to one of household labor supply, where joint decisions are taken on “who applies
for jobs, where”. This is a more complicated model and won’t be pursued here.
The impact of regional variables on the decision of applying for a formal sector
job depend on which sample is being considered. In the sample containing self-
employed, being in the US Border increases the probability of applying for such
jobs, while being in the other regions decreases it. In the sample with wage workers
only however, all the regions have large positive effects for applying for such jobs,
in comparison to Mexico City.
The effects of wealth proxies on the decision of applying for a formal sector job
are similar to the ones found in the univariate (free entry) model, namely, they
positively affect the desire of being in the formal sector.18
The decision of the employer to hire a worker is always positively associated
with the education of the applicant. Younger workers are more likely to be accepted
into formal sector jobs in the sample including self-employed, but in the sample
including wage workers only, age plays either no role or a negative one. This could
be an indication that old workers who are rejected from formal sector jobs tend
to become informally self-employed. Being a male is negatively associated with
the probability of being hired in the sample including self-employed, but shows no
effect in the sample with wage workers.
Finally, regarding the impact of region dummies on the probability of being
accepted in the formal sector, while no clear pattern arises in the sample with self-
employed, the other sample consistently shows that applicants to formal sector
jobs are more likely to be hired in the US Border region, while workers in other
regions have a smaller relative probability of being accepted in that sector.
18With the exception of the “Type of Dwelling” variable.
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Table 5.3: Probit Models of Sector Allocation. Wage Workers Only. Q1:87-Q2:93
No Rationing Model Rationing Model
Pr(Formal=1) Pr(A=1) Pr(E=1|A=1)
Age
Linear 0.0486 *** 0.0554 *** 0.0074
(0.007) (0.005) (0.013)
Squared -0.0005 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education
Linear 0.1383 *** 0.1034 *** 0.0997 ***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.015)
Squared -0.0011 *** -0.0003 0.0079
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002)




US Border 0.1575 *** 0.1048 *** 0.3659 ***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.071)
North 0.1855 *** 0.2984 *** -0.3903 ***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.038)
Center 0.0534 *** 0.0849 *** -0.1843 ***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.036)
South 0.1760 *** 0.1841 *** 0.0001
(0.026) (0.040) (0.110)
Married 0.1739 *** 0.2141 ***
(0.020) (0.014)
Household Structure
# hh members >11yrs 0.0058 0.0015
(0.004) (0.003)
# hh members <12yrs -0.0298 *** -0.0351 ***
(0.006) (0.004)
Wealth Proxies
Cluster Average Income 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant -1.2416 *** -0.7500 *** 0.2080
(0.150) (0.102) (0.268)
No. Observations 143,951 143,951
Log-Likelihood -47,377.9 -46,708.9
LRT statistic 1338.0 p-value 0.000








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The results for the estimated earnings equations for each sector, corrected for selec-
tivity bias, are included in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. These tables show that earnings rise
with age at a decreasing rate, and the age profile is less steep in the wage worker’s
sample. For most of the panels, education displays a U-pattern on earnings. In
the sample including (informal) self-employed, an extra year of education brings
higher gains to informal sector workers, holding everything else constant; however,
the opposite occurs in the sample including only wage workers. This result might
reflect that there are some returns to capital in what self-employed individuals re-
port as their “labor earnings”. The effect of being male on earnings is quite high,
and in the wage worker’s sample, this effect is higher in the informal sector.
Being in the US Border region brings higher earnings than any other region,
while being in the South lowers earnings more than any other region. Furthermore,
ceteris paribus, being in the informal sector in the US Border region brings higher
earnings than being in the formal sector.
Finally, the selectivity correction parameters for the workers and the employers
equation, i.e., λw, λe, are for the most part negative and statistically significant.
This is somewhat puzzling, because it means that the unobserved factors that lead
to higher earnings (in each sector) are negatively correlated with the unobserved
factors that lead workers to apply to formal sector jobs and the unobserved factors





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.4.3 Predictions of the Model
This section analyzes some of the predictions stemming from the previous models.
In Table 5.7 the number of predicted restricted individuals as a percentage
of the total population is presented. The specification including informal self-
employed is labeled Model 1 from now on, and the one keeping only wage workers,
Model 2. The bottom table also contains the same numbers expressed as a per-
centage of the total number of individuals in each sector. In order to make these
predictions it is assumed that any individual currently working in the informal
sector, for whom the probability of applying to a formal sector job is greater than
0.5, i.e., Pr(A=1|X)>0.5, is restricted from entering the formal sector.
These two tables show that Models 1 and 2 predict most of the informal sector
individuals to be rationed out of the formal sector. In both cases more than 90%
of the individuals in the informal sector are predicted to be rationed. This number
seems extremely high. Although, it makes sense to believe that the segmentation
model fits better the Mexican case based on the results presented in the previous
sections, there is also evidence that a fraction of the informal self-employed are in
that state by choice and not by force.19
The fact that the model predicts such a high number of restricted individuals,
calls for further revisions of the econometric specification. As a defense of the
model and the segmentation result obtained in the previous sections, it must be
said that these extreme predictions do not disqualify the previous findings in the
probit model. After all, a probit model is not designed to maximize the prediction
19Maloney (1999) provides evidence based on a survey on micro-enterprises that
2/3rds of the workers leaving a formal sector wage job to form an enterprise do
so looking for either higher wages or more independence. The problem with his
result is that it is based on an extremely small sample (less than 200 obs.), and it
does not distinguish between formal and informal self-employed individuals.
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Table 5.7: Percentage of Predicted Restricted Individuals.
% of Total Population





% of Individuals in each Sector
Model 1 Model 2
Period % Self-employed % Workers %Workers
Q1:87-Q2:93 91.5 89.6 99.9
Q3:94-Q1:99 93.4 91.2 98.1
Q2:99-Q4:01 95.0 93.8 96.4
Model 2 excludes Informal Self-employed.
quality of the model (as for instance Manski’s Maximum Score model). Further-
more, the model does not incorporate panel information on its structure to control
for potential fixed unobserved heterogeneity. Two ways to test the robustness
of the sector choice model are: (1) perform tests of normality, and (2) allow for
heteroskedasticity in the probit models.20 These extensions will be left for future
research. Instead, the approach taken in the rest of the chapter is to provide some
further evidence on the sector and earnings mobility of these (predicted) restricted
individuals using the panel information available in the survey.
Table 5.8 contains the percentage of individuals, restricted and non-restricted,
who moved into the formal sector. This table also displays the percentage of re-
stricted individuals who moved into the formal sector during a year, by their sector
of origin.21 The interesting fact in this table is that around 30% of the predicted
20The presence of heteroskedasticity in nonlinear models alters not only the
estimates of the standard errors, but also of the main parameters of interest.
21The latter calculation is made for Model 1 only, since this is the only model
that contains two types of informal sector workers (the self-employed and the wage
workers).
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Table 5.8: Fraction of Individuals who Moved into Formal Sector.
Model 1 Model 2
Period Restricted Non Restricted Restricted Non Restricted
Q1:87-Q2:93 23.2 76.4 35.5 79.6
Q3:94-Q1:99 22.8 83.4 33.5 86.5
Q2:99-Q4:01 24.9 83.9 35.5 85.8
% Restricted % Restricted




Estimates based on Model 1
restricted individuals manage to enter the formal sector within one year.22 This
result, rather than undermine the conclusions of the model, it indicates that maybe
the high rates of predicted restricted individuals arise because these predictions
are made for a given point in time (the first period of the interview). However, as
time goes by restricted individuals manage to move into the formal sector. This
finding by the way, does not contradict the theory of segmented labor markets. On
the contrary, the idea that workers might move one day into the formal sector lies
at the core of models like the ones of Harris and Todaro (1970) and Fields (1975).
It is precisely the positive probability of one day becoming formal that motivates
workers to stay in the urban areas, even in the presence of unemployment.23
Moving now to the analysis of earnings mobility, Table 5.9 shows the potential
22The fact that the vast majority of the non-restricted individuals is found in the
formal sector later on is not surprising, given that most of these workers started
in the formal sector and kept their jobs over time.
23A subsidiary result obtained from this exercise is that restricted individuals
have a much higher rate of attrition from the panel than non-restricted ones, even
after controlling for a set of individual characteristics. This is consistent with the
idea that restricted individuals would move to other locations in search of better
opportunities.
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Table 5.9: Potential Median Earnings Gains for a Restricted Individual Moving into
Formal Sector.
Mx Pesos (2002=100) % of Median Earnings
Period Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Q1:87-Q2:93 221.0 519.8 7.1 22.8
Q3:94-Q1:99 472.4 537.1 20.2 29.0
Q2:99-Q4:01 436.1 501.6 16.7 23.8
Model 2 excludes Informal Self-employed.
gains that a restricted individual in the informal sector could experience by moving
to the formal sector. These potential gains are constructed by predicting formal
sector earnings for restricted individuals, using the selectivity corrected earnings
equations (5.8) and (5.9), and subtracting from this prediction their current earn-
ings. Both models predict that there will be positive median gains from such
transition (fluctuating between 7% and 30% of the initial period median earn-
ings). In particular, the model including only wage workers (Model 2) predicts
even higher gains from this transition, because wage workers earn less than the
informal self-employed.
Finally, Table 5.10 presents the actual earnings mobility experienced by the
restricted individuals one year after the period in which the model was fitted. The
table decomposes the results by sector of destination, and includes both uncon-
ditional gains and gains conditional on a set of individual characteristics.24 This
table show mobility patterns similar to the ones presented in Chapter 4. Both
conditionally and unconditionally, restricted individuals experience higher mobil-
ity when moving into formal self-employment, and besides movements into unem-
ployment, which trivially imply large losses, the worst destination sector in terms
of earnings mobility is the informal wage work. In most of the cases, transitions
24The control variables were age, education, gender, regional dummies and initial
earnings.
165
into informal self-employment bring larger gains than the ones into formal wage
work.
It is important to remark that without panel data that follows individuals for
longer periods of time, it is hard to assess whether these sector transitions are a
permanent phenomenon or a transitory one; i.e., it is hard to know if an informal
worker who moved to the formal sector will keep his job for a long time. Also, it is
important to note that the actual unconditional gains of individuals moving into
the formal sector are smaller than the gains predicted by the earnings equations
(5.8) and (5.9). This is an indication that the model overestimates the potential




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This chapter tested whether Mexican labor markets are segmented, in particular
whether formal sector jobs are rationed, and what are the implications of this
segmentation for earnings mobility.
The test for segmentation in labor markets consisted of comparing a model that
assumed free entry into the formal sector to one that allowed for the possibility of
rationing of formal sector jobs. Since the data only reveals the sector of the worker,
and not his willingness to enter the formal sector, a bivariate probit with partial
observability was used when estimating the components of the sector allocation
model that allowed for rationing.
In addition to this, selectivity-corrected earnings equations were estimated for
each sector. These equations were used to calculate the potential earnings gains of
entering the formal sector, for individuals predicted to be restricted from entering
this sector. Finally, the chapter used the panel structure of the data to analyze
the sector and earnings mobility experienced in further periods, by individuals
predicted to be restricted from entering the formal sector in the initial period.
To the question of whether formal salaried jobs are rationed in Mexico, the
answer obtained was affirmative. The discrete choice model that assumed free
movement across sectors was strongly rejected versus a richer model that allowed
the possibility of formal sector job rationing. This conclusion was reached for
samples with and without informal self-employed.
Some important factors affecting the worker’s decision to apply to formal sector
jobs were the individual’s years of education and his wealth proxies, with a positive
effect, and the number of children in the household, with a negative effect. Other
variables like age, gender, marital status, region and number of adults present in
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the household played a role too in affecting this decision, but their impact varied
depending on the years and the sample analyzed (meaning by this whether the
estimations included informal self-employed or not).
Regarding the employer’s decision, more years of education for the worker al-
ways increased his probability of being hired in the formal sector. Also, being a
woman and being young increased this probability in the sample containing in-
formal self-employed individuals. Finally, in the sample with wage workers only,
living in cities along the US Border increased the probability of being hired by a
formal sector employer.
The selectivity-corrected earnings equations showed positive effects from age,
and large positive effects on earnings for being male. Education presented a U-
shaped pattern, first decreasing then increasing, and in the sample with informal
wage workers only, more education brought larger gains in the formal sector. Also,
holding everything else constant, living in cities along the US Border was associated
with higher earnings, especially in the informal sector.
The sector choice model predicted that more than 90% of the informal sector
workers were restricted from entering the formal sector. Although this number
seems too high, analysis of the sectoral mobility patterns in further periods showed
that around 30% of those restricted individuals managed to find a formal sector
job within one year. This suggests that part of the reason why the model predicted
such a high number of restricted individuals is because the predictions hold at a
given point in time and, as time passes by, sector mobility starts to occur.
To the question of “What are the potential earnings gains that rationed individ-
uals could experience by moving into the formal sector?” the estimations predict
that if individuals rationed out of the formal sector were to move to the formal
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sector, they would experience gains going from 7% to 30% of their current earn-
ings, depending on the sample. While the prediction of upward earnings mobility
is confirmed by looking at the actual earnings gains experienced by restricted in-
dividuals who moved into the formal sector after a year, the actual earnings gains
were smaller than the predicted ones. The most desirable destination sector in
terms of earnings mobility is formal self-employment, and the least desirable one
is informal salaried work.
Although the proposed model performs better than a free entry one, many
issues require further research. In particular, tests for the distributional assump-
tions, as well as for heteroskedasticity in the data, should be performed. It is also
important to explore whether under less restrictive assumptions, the model gener-
ates more credible predictions about the extent of segmentation in labor markets.
Even with these limitations, the previous estimations show that the issue of seg-





Since the models in this chapter are cross-sectional, they are estimated at the
first interview for each individual. This eliminates the potential negative effects of
attrition from the panel, and makes the results representative of the urban popula-
tion in Mexico. Since using individuals observed at the first interview imposes less
restrictions than the ones previously encountered in chapters 3 and 4, the sample
analyzed here differs somewhat from the previous ones. Due to this discrepancy,
new descriptive statistics for this less restrictive sample are presented in Table
5.11.
For the purpose of comparison with chapters 3 and 4, the sample was restricted









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.6.2 Selectivity Correction Model
This section presents the derivation of the selectivity correction terms in its most
general form, in a model of double selection with partial observability. The notation
in this section is different from the one previously used, in order to keep the model
general.
Let the two selection rules be determined by the following equations
y∗i1 = Zi1γ1 + ui1 (5.10)
y∗i2 = Zi2γ2 + ui2 (5.11)
The terms y∗i1, y
∗
i2 are the latent variables that determine each selection rule, the
vectors Zi1, Zi2 are the observable factors affecting these latent variables, and the
error terms ui1, ui2 are assumed to be bivariate normally distributed with correla-
tion ρ among themselves, i.e., (ui1, ui2)
′ ∼ N(0,Σ).
The outcome of this latent variables is summarized by two dichotomous vari-
ables Di1 and Di2, where
Di1 =
 1 if y
∗
i1 ≥ 0,
0 if y∗i1 < 0.
Di2 =
 1 if y
∗
i2 ≥ 0,
0 if y∗i2 < 0.
In this model of partial observability the individual is observed in state A if
and only if both y∗i1 > 0 and y
∗
i2 > 0, i.e., if Di1 = 1 and Di2 = 1. Denote the
probability of this event by PA, i.e.,
PA = Pr(D1 = 1, D2 = 1) = G(Z1γ1, Z2γ2; ρ)
where G(·, ·; ρ) is the bivariate normal distribution function with correlation coef-
ficient ρ. The probability of the individual being in the other state B, is 1− PA.
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There are two outcome equations associated with each state (A,B)
yiA = XiAβA + εiA (5.12)
yiB = XiBβB + εiB (5.13)
The error terms εiA and εiB are assumed to be equal to each other, i.e. εiA =
εiB = εi.
25 Furthermore, the error term εi is assumed to have mean zero, finite
variance σ2ε , and to be a linear function of ui1, ui2.
26




















i.e., the conditional expectation of εi given that the individuals are observed in
state A is
E(εi|D1 = 1, D2 = 1) = ρA1λA1 + ρA2λA2
.
Using these results, equivalent terms can be derived for equation (5.13) by
applying the Law of Iterated Expectations (LIE). In particular, it follows that
λB1 =
−φ(C1)Φ(C∗2)
1− PA λB2 =
−φ(C2)Φ(C∗1)
1− PA
25This assumption will be necessary to be able to apply the Law of Iterated
Expectations.
26This linearity assumption together with the bivariate normality of (ui1, ui2) is
equivalent to assuming trivariate normality of the vector (ui1, ui2, εi). However, if
the bivariate normality assumption is dropped, but the linearity one is kept, this
can lead to other types of two-step selectivity correction models.
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since the LIE implies
E(εi) = PAE(εi|D1 = 1, D2 = 1) + (1− PA)E(εi|D1 = 0 ∨D2 = 0)
and since it was assumed that E(εi) = 0. With this expression in hand it follows
that
E(εi|D1 = 0 ∨D2 = 0) = ρB1λB1 + ρB2λB2.
Extensions for the expressions for the conditional second moments and variance
of εi, as well as for the standard error of the regression, the variance-covariance
matrix, and the gradient vectors that apply to equation (5.13) readily follow from
the expressions included in Tunalı (1986), by substituting the ρA1, ρA2 by ρB1, ρB2,
and PA by 1− PA, where appropriate. Note also that the expressions in (5.6) and
(5.7) follow from the previously derived λ’s by assuming ρ = 0.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
This dissertation studied labor earnings mobility in the short-run and the struc-
ture of labor markets in urban Mexico, from 1987 to 2002. The topics addressed
included aggregate earnings mobility, the determinants of earnings mobility with
a special emphasis on the impact of initial earnings on mobility, and segmentation
in Mexican labor markets and its implications for earnings mobility. These topics
were analyzed under varying macroeconomic conditions. In particular, the effects
of the 1994 Peso crisis were examined.
The first substantive chapter on this dissertation (Chapter 3) was devoted
to issues of aggregate earnings mobility. In particular, it focused on measuring
the concepts of Directional mobility and Mobility as an equalizer of longer-term
earnings. Regarding Directional mobility, the questions asked were: “What are
the average earnings gains and losses in the economy?” and “Are these earnings
mobility patterns the same for different groups of the population?”. The groups of
the population analyzed included age, education, gender, initial earnings quintile,
region and sector groups. In overall terms, the results obtained show that average
earnings mobility fluctuated around zero, with the exception of the late eighties
and early 2000, when individuals experienced upward earnings mobility, and of
the years following the 1994 Peso crisis, when individuals experienced large losses.
These patterns were shared by the majority of the subgroups of the population.
The only groups for which significant differences appear in their mobility patterns
are initial earnings quintile and sector groups. In both cases, the most advantaged
individuals experienced the largest losses, while the ones that initially had the
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smallest earnings, experienced the largest gains. These results held both in absolute
and proportional terms.
The questions concerning Mobility as an equalizer of longer-term earnings were:
“Does mobility equalize earnings over time?”, “Does mobility equalize earnings
within groups over time?” and “Does mobility equalize earnings between groups
over time?”. The data showed that mobility equalized longer-term earnings for
most of the periods studied. Only for a couple of years in the late eighties, a
disequalizing pattern was found. It was also found that in general, mobility equal-
ized longer-term earnings within-groups over a year, while it sometimes equalized
and others disequalized longer-term earnings between-groups of the population.
The only exception to this occurred for initial earnings quintile groups, for which
earnings mobility equalized longer-term earnings between-groups. One interesting
finding was that mobility almost always disequalized longer-term earnings between
men and women, but it reduced the longer-term earnings inequality within-genders.
At the end, the equalizing effect within genders dominated the disequalizing one
found between-genders.
The second substantive chapter in this dissertation is Chapter 4, which exam-
ined earnings mobility at the individual level. In particular, it studied the impact
of initial earnings and other variables on earnings mobility. In this chapter, special
attention was given to the issue of whether mobility benefited initially advantaged
individuals, or whether it benefited the disadvantaged ones. The answer to the
question “Are the most advantaged individuals gaining more (losing less) in terms
of earnings changes?” is that no; in most of the cases the advantaged individuals
kept their advantage, but the rich individuals did not get richer. Although the com-
parison of earnings changes to initial earnings showed a high level of convergence
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between the earnings of rich and poor, further analysis revealed that part of this
convergence was due to the adjustment of earnings from transitory fluctuations to
its permanent level. In other words, besides the effects of transitory adjustments
in earnings, there was little, or no convergence, between rich and poor. The only
major exception to this finding occurred in the aftermath of the 1994 Peso crisis,
when individuals with a high permanent advantage experienced greater losses than
everybody else. This crisis generated proportional losses across the earnings distri-
bution, leading to larger losses in pesos for the permanent rich individuals. In the
light of these results, the conclusions reached in Chapter 3 on the role of mobility
in equalizing longer-term earnings between initial earnings quintile groups, must
be reinterpreted as arising most of the times because of transitory adjustments in
earnings, and not because of a lasting convergence between rich and poor.
Chapter 4 also addressed the ceteris paribus impact of socioeconomic char-
acteristics of the individual on earnings mobility, and how accounting for these
socioeconomic factors affects the impact of initial earnings on mobility. Here it
was found that, holding everything else constant, more education lead to nega-
tive mobility for individuals with a low level of education, however after a certain
point (around elementary education), more education was associated with upward
conditional mobility. Being male and living in cities by the US Border and in
the North of the country, brought large positive earnings mobility. Sector transi-
tions into formal self-employment were associated with the largest gains (smallest
losses), while transitions into informal wage work brought about the largest losses
(smallest gains) (besides, of course, movements into unemployment). Finally, once
all these socioeconomic factors were controlled for, initial earnings had a strong
negative effect on mobility, meaning that individuals converged to their own per-
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manent earnings. The fact that the conditional convergence rates (the convergence
rates obtained after controlling for socioeconomic characteristics of the individual)
were stronger than the unconditional ones (without such controls), implies that the
overall effect of these characteristics generated divergence between rich and poor,
but this effect was not strong enough to counteract the adjustment of earnings
back to their permanent level.
This chapter also performed some robustness tests to assess the impact of
measurement error on the earnings variable, and attrition and non-reporting in the
sample. While the effects of measurement error in earnings are usually minor in
the case of aggregate measures of mobility (e.g. taking averages across individuals
averages out the measurement error) this problem can lead to serious biases when
estimating the regressions performed in Chapter 4. The simulations performed
indicate that, while measurement error in the earnings variable can create problems
in individual mobility analyses, it is unlikely that the mobility results obtained were
mainly driven by the measurement error component of earnings.
A more serious problem with the present data, is the large amount of individuals
for whom there is no information in the final period. The main reasons for this loss
of information are attrition from the panel and non-reporting of earnings. While
it is possible that part of the attrition is random, evidence is provided that rich
individuals are less likely to report their earnings, complicating the assessment
of their mobility. For all these reasons, the mobility results presented in this
dissertation do not necessarily apply to the whole urban population in Mexico.
Finally, Chapter 5 tested whether Mexican urban labor markets were segmented
in formal and informal sectors. The estimations showed support for the hypothesis
that labor markets are segmented. In other words, the answer to the question
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of “Are formal sector jobs rationed?” is affirmative. Some factors that positively
affected the decision of a worker to apply for a formal sector job were his education
and his wealth. On the other hand, the number of children in the household affected
negatively this decision. It was also found that the education of the worker was
always positively associated with the probability of being hired by a formal sector
employer.
The sector assignment model generated somewhat extreme predictions about
the extent of segmentation in the labor markets. In particular, it predicted that
more than 90% of the current informal sector workers were rationed out of the for-
mal sector. While this number seems too high, it was also found that around 30%
of those restricted individuals managed to find a formal sector job within a year.
That chapter also assessed what were the potential earnings gains that rationed
individuals could experience by moving into the formal sector and what was the
actual earnings mobility experienced by rationed individuals, if they managed to
enter the formal sector after one year. The analysis showed that an individual
rationed out of the formal sector would on average experience substantial earnings
gains if he were to move to the formal sector. The predicted gains are between
7% and 30% of their initial earnings, depending on the sample analyzed. In prac-
tice, when comparing these predictions to the gains actually experienced by those
restricted individuals who managed to enter the formal sector after one year, it
was found that the actual earnings mobility was smaller than predicted. Although
the specification of the econometric model needs further tests, Chapter 5 showed
that the issue of segmentation in labor markets in urban Mexico is far from being
settled, as previous studies had maintained.
The conclusions reached in this dissertation motivate further research that
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could give a better picture of the functioning of labor markets in Mexico. In
particular, it would be interesting to do a more detailed analysis of the short-run
dynamic structure of earnings incorporating the information on quarterly earnings.
This study could enrich the model of yearly earnings dynamics here presented, and
help in better capturing the effects of measurement error on earnings.
One important aspect, omitted in this dissertation, was the study of aggre-
gate positional earnings mobility. According to the author’s opinion, this is an
important topic that has not been pursued satisfactorily in the literature. Most
of the positional mobility literature has focused on comparing the mobility of an
individual to the whole population. However, in practice there is evidence that in-
dividuals pay a lot of attention (if not more) to their relative position within small
groups to which they relate, e.g. their communities, their peers, etc. It would be
interesting to extend the previous analyses in order incorporate this fact.
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